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MR. JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON, JURIST IN LIMINE:
THE JUDGE AS HISTORIAN AND MAKER OF HISTORY*

A. J. Levint

I
JOHNSON'S INTEREST IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

A. Publication of Johnson's Life of General Greene

I

N THE YEAR r 822 A. E. Miller. of No. 4 Broad-street, near
the Bay, Charleston, South Carolina, "Printed for the Author" the
Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene, Major
General of The Armies of The United States, In The War of The
Revolution. The fly-leaf announced that the work was "Compiled
Chiefly from Original Materials" and that it was in "Two Volumes"
by William Johnson of Charleston, South Carolina. It was, indeed,
a substantial publication "grown to a bulk . . . never anticipated" 1 of
some nine hundred thirty-eight pages exclusive of numerous pages in
small print comprising the Preface, Appendices and a Postscript. There
was the usual copyright legend and a dedication which reflecte~ a deep
emotional tone, for it was "to the Venerable Survivors of the Soldiers
of the Revolution" by one "who in humility, acknowledges that, exalted as had been his previous admiration of their worth and services,
he had formed but a faint idea of their virtues.and sufferings, until
drawn to the study of their actions in the unaffected narrative and unquestionable authority of their own correspondence." His interest
clearly was not in his "hero" only.
The Life of Greene is as much a history of the American Revolu-

*
t

This is the first of three articles on Mr. Justice Johnson to be published in this
volume of the REVIEW. They will conclude Mr. Levin's studies on this subject.-Ed.
Member of the, (Detroit) Michigan Bar A.B., J.D., University of Michigan;
author, "Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Unenviable Dilemma," 42 MICH. L.
REv. 803 (1944); "Mr. Justice William Johnson, Creative Dissenter," 43 MICH. L.
REv. 497 (1944); "Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Common Incidents of Life,"
44 MICH. L. REV. 59, 243 (1945) ;•and other articles in this and other legal periodicals.-£ d.
,
1
Preface, p. x. The work is hereafter referred to as WILLIAM JoHNSON.
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tion, particularly in the southern field, as the life of Johnson is a history
of the early struggles of the Constitution. It was published in limited
edition, with admitted financial risk and without the motive of pecuniary reward, in one of the most depressive periods of Johnson's life,
when it seemed as if the ugly prospect of disunion might destroy what
the Revolution had begun. He was beginning to find that his independence of mind was isolating him at home. Accordingly, he addressed himself in the Preface as well to his adversaries as to his
friends: "To make an enemy, is to incur one of the greatest misfortunes in life; and hence true history seldom commences under a century after important events -hav~ occurred. In the effort to place
myself at the end of that century, and write as one would write from
the same materials, who could not incur a frown from living man, I
know that I have exposed myself to the painful feelings of one who
gives umbrage where he would most deprecate it." 2 Here is surely
an attempt to achieve that so rarely accomplished objective detachment.
We may appropriately recall at this point C. K. Ogden's comment that
it was Benthan's wish "that the nature of the universe might be such as
to allow him once every century to revisit the scene of his labors, and
observe the progress of the ideas and movements he had initiated." 8
Both of these men in their time were yet in advance of their time in
their ability to remove from their thinking much of the artificiality
which had become habitual through the ages. 4
Many factors undoubtedly contributed to Johnson's selection of
Greene as his hero. We know now-indeed, Johnson knew it thenthat myriads of associations contribute to human selection. Deep
psychological motives and identifications controlled the direction of his
decision. Initially, there were some likenesses between General Greene
and Johnson's father. Greene had begun as an artisan, a mill-hand:
Johnson's father had been a blacksmith. Johnson's father had been one
of th,e sparks which lighted the flame of revolution in South Carolina
and had, -therefore, been in large measure responsible for her liberation: Greene had conducted his most successful campaigns in the
southern theatre. There was much, too, that appealed to Johnson in the
2

lbid.
From C. K. Ogden's Introduction to J EREMEY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF
LEGISLATION xxix (1931).
4 See comment on Bentham in Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson and the
Common Incidents of Life: II," 44 MICH, L. REv. 243 at 285 (1945).
8
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mental qualities of Greene's Quaker father 5 but he was sufficiently
discriminating to find himself out of sympathy with the fact that the
young Greene had "literally received a Spartan education," 6 notwith'standing a military education was farthest from his father's mind.
Johnson sensed that the mind of man revolts against "unnatural and
unnecessary privation" and "Spartan discipline." 7 He discerned in the
lessons of the "rod and a vigorous arm" 8 the retaliating revolt of youth.
Johnson's psychology was almost uncannily modern.
Johnson confessed an admiration for Greene's "strong mind, quick
parts, and a cultivated understanding . . . the most happy combination
for public usefulness." 9 This, indeed, is what he found in George
Washington-"the fine combining head, comprehensive mind, and
analytic turn of thought" which supplied the defect of experience.10
Both Washington and Greene had been taught in the "school of adversity." He perceived that General Greene in a difficult situation
had the ability to "exhibit a degree of foresight and intelligence in the
choice of means" necessary to attain his objective.11. Johnson's appreciation of men was based not only upon their action but upon their understanding. The great leader had to possess this- combination. That is
why we must call attention to the fact that Greene mirrored his
biographer's own devotion to the interests of mankind and to the fact
that both suffered the same anxiety about the new experiment in
democracy. Johnson shared Greene's "fervour for the general good."12
Greene was in many respects what Johnson was and wanted to be.
"There is a sympathy," Johnson confessed, "between talents and integrity, by which those who possess these intuitively discover them in ·
others." 18
Another aspect of Greene's life experience also furnished some
pages in Johnson's own life history. The justice observed that while
Greene never lost a friend it was part of his lot that "his character was
obscured by calumny and misconstruction." 14 Johnson himself suffered in much the same way and easily identified himself with one who
was in like manner burdened. We do not believe it to be too remote to
suggest that the choice of Greene as a subject of biogra:phy was partly
5
8
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Id.
7
Id.
sid.
9
Id.

6.
14.
7.
26.

7•

Id. 27.
Id. 31.
12
Ibid.
18
Id. 26.
14
Ibid.
10
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motivated, though perhaps unconsciously, by the circumstance that
John Marshall had written a life of George Washington. -The idea
here is not that Marshall had occupied the field but rather that Associate Justice Johnson, subordinate in rank to the Chief Justice, chose a
general who was second in command to Washington. And what is
more, he was a favorite of Washington and chosen by him for special
and difficult duty. Johnson's own words set out in his preface confess
an identification more general in nature, since persons do not always
reveal their motives and often are not consciously aware of them. In
his words, it was his motive "to bring the reader familiarly acquainted
with the character of my' hero: subordinate to this object, to throw light
on the history of the times in which he flourished, and of my country
generally.... But the reader will pardon me for observing, that I have
written for my own amusement as well as his." 15 His "amusement"
was really an emotional reliving of the lives and dynamic events of
which he wrote: "When the life of the individual becomes identified
with the revolutionary history, I have endeavoured to use the latter as
the frame-work in which to suspend my Sketches." 16 Thus, he perceived that true history must concern itself with men, and surely the
writer of such history cannot avoid his own identifications with the
actors, though he must endeavour to understand their import. Shakespeare put it quite clearly in the words of Polixenes to Gtmillo in
A Winter's Tale:
". . . Good Camillo,
Your chang'd complexions are to me a mirror,
Which shows me mine chang'd too; for I must be
A party in this alteration, finding
Myself thus alter'd with 't." 11
There could be no question that Johnson felt himself "altered" by
the men and events: "Intrenched behind a mass of four thousand original letters, written by the hands of all distinguished men of a period,
the events of which are destined to change the face of the world, I
really felt an irresistible desire to loiter away my time in the most
brilliant assembly that I can ever again hope to be encircled by." 18
Johnson was struggling with dynamic forces within himself; but
succeeded in channelling them by giving vigor and clear expression to
15

Id: viii.
lbid.
17
Act I, Scene z.
18 Preface, I WILLIAM

16

JOHNSON

viii_. (Italics the writer's.)

•
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a new humanitarian view of life. He had already antagonized the
citizens of Charleston and the State of South Carolina, indeed, the
whole South, when the Life of Greene was given to the public. His
zeal was of itself a cause of provocation to others who lacked his insight
into the real causes of what had taken place. They released their repressed affect with force and venom and destructive purpose. It is
now believed that aggression often seeks "traditional patterning," 19 a
socially~accepted form of release. To indulge in~a bitter personal attack upon an historian, particularly when some minor basis for the
attack was present, was a convenient means of indulging in hostile conduct which might ordinarily have taken the turn of a breach of the
peace or found an outlet in racial or political prejudice.

B. Critical Appraisals of the Life of Greene
Johnson was the official biographer of General Greene. He had
been selected by the family who turneq. all of Greene's papers over to
him. It is extremely doubtful whether the work would have been
undertaken without that consent since Johnson wrote that he had "too
high a sense of honor to attempt the undertaking without the assent
of the family, as well as a perfect knowledge of the impracticability of
e:ffecting it without the papers in their possession.•.." 20 The accuracy
of the work has been challenged by some historians who have not fully
appraised the genuine purpose of Johnson's treatment of the subject
and times. Randolph G. Adams, an authority on the revolutionary
' period, has cautioned that the Life of Greene is based upon the study
of the Greene manuscripts and is ex parte and must, therefore, "be
used with extreme care." 21 In Justin Winsor's Narrative and Critical
History of America we read:
"The most formidable of these early biographies was the work
of Judge Johnson of Charleston. He enjoyed the best facilities, as
the Greenes placed the family papers at his disposal. Many of
these documents he printed at length and as a repository his work
19

See JoHN DoLLARD, FRUSTRATION AND AGGRESSION 152 (1939).
Id. vii. See also 13 S.C. HIST. AND GEN. MAG. 78 (1912).
Some decades later a grandson of General Greene, George Washington Greene,
wrote THE LIFE OF NATHANIEL GREENE (1871) in three volumes. The only references to Johnson are in the following footnotes: Vol. l, notes on pp. 4 58, 48 l ; Vol. 2,
note on p. 150; Vol. 3, notes on pp. 33, 157, 252, 320, 328, 332, 340, 342, 343,
374, 386, 403, 410, 4II, 418, 419, 422, 423, 426, 427, 429, 434, 444, 452, 458,
472, 489, 519.
21
In footnote to the biography of General Greene in 7 DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 573 (1931).
20
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has value. In other respects it is worth very little. This is due
mainly to the fact that in order to glorify his hero he belittled
every other prominent character-with the exception of Marion.
A formidable antagonist of Johnson was found in the person of
Henry Lee, the son of Light-Horse-Harry. He resented the slurs
of Johnson, and even wrote a book to show the small reliance to
be placed on the learned judge's military criticisms." 22
The work referred to was published by Lee under the title, The

Campaign of z87z in The Carolinas, With Remarks, Historical And
Critical on Johnson's Life of Greene, to which is added an Appendix of
Original Documents. It was published in Philadelphia in 1824.
But despite the fact that much ad hominem feeling was displaced
upon the biography which was really meant for the biographer-a
common psychodynamic occurrence-some, on the other hand, evaluated the work in its context. Although Jefferson had been estranged
from Johnson because of earlier differences, he was gratified on reading
the Life of Greene. "I really rejoice," he wrote Johnson on October 27,
1822, "that we have at length a fair history of the Southern war." 28
Errors did creep into the history in the author's zeal to raise his
hero to his earned stature. But the critics were less moved, it would
appear, by the desire to correct error than by the excitation offered by
the prospect of a "kill." Johnson was set upon with a savagery so often
the concomitant of the effort to create something new. For the biography was also the vehicle for his expression of views on some of the
most controverted questions of the times. He was an avowed patriot,
a protagonist of the new experiment in government. Some who differed attacked him with a bitterness which would have tried the strongest mind.
Notwithstanding its defects Johnson has left one of the few vivid
pictures of the struggle for independence at a time when the writing of
history was practiced by very few competent historians. Its great value
is not in its narration of events but rather in its portrayal of some of the
dynamic causes and underlying motives which led to the Revolution.
He also managed-because he "relived" the lives of the actors-to
preserve some of the feeling which attended the trials and errors, the
sufferings and hopes of those who bore the brunt of the burden. It
has value, then, as a psychological study. 'It is also a record of some of
the military campaigns and the political difficulties which they produced. Johnson's grandnephew, Edward McCrady, an eminent his22
28

Vol. 6, p.

511 (1888).
IO FORD, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 222 (1892).
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torian of the South, agreeing with Jefferson's appraisal, concluded that
"Judge Johnson's work, notwithstanding his partiality for Greene ..•
is, nevertheless, the fullest and best history of the War of the Revolution in South Carolina." 24
But, while Johnson was writing history, he never lost sight of the
person of his "hero." For, Greene in person stood also for the oppressed Colonies. "He, in common with all other men who have acted
a conspicuous part in life, had at times his enemies; his conduct was
misunderstood, misinterpreted, or misrepresented; nor did he escape
the commission of faults." 25 Johnson braced himself and his hopes for
the success of the Union by identifying with Greene's capacity to surmount obstacles-" • • .among the most constructive and useful lessons
in life, is that of a superior mind guided by sound principles, struggling
against the united disadvantage of poverty, obscurity, and prejudice,
rising superior to every difficulty, and emerging to fame and utility." 26
Despite a strong aversion to "that propensity of some authors to show
more of themselves than their hero" 27 as already suggested, the Life
of Greene, remains a most fruitful source of self-revelation of Johnson's innermost feelings.
C. Johnson's Reaction to his Critics
Johnson promised in his preface that he would joyfully "acknowledge every error that shall be candidly revealed" to him. He kept
this promise where he felt he had been mistaken; 28 but his willingness
24
McCRAnY, THE HISTORY OF SouTH CAROLINA IN THE REvoLUTioN, 17801783, p. 56, note (1902).
Jared Sparks, reviewing the LIFE OF GREENE in the NoRTH AMERICAN REVIEW of
which he was editor, remarked that "a degree of implacability pervades the work, which
we were sorry to discover." 15 N. AM. REv. 423 (1822). Sparks, later to be known
as an historian of note, admitted a portion of the work to be "a valuable accession to the
history of the revolution" (id. 427); but he failed to understand the dynamic quality
of Johnson's mind. Thus, we find Sparks complaining: "We sometimes meet with a
word which has not yet found its way into our vocabularies, such as 'dampening,' 'retroact,' 'protosire,' 'aggressive,' and 'bread-stuffs;' others of doubtful authority as 'proclivity'••••" (Id. at 429). Johnson had to defend not only his ideas but his words.
In both he was in advance of his times.
25
1 WILLIAM JoHNSON 28. See also pp. 182-183 where he speaks of the "cruel
and unjust persecution of Greene"; also vol. 2, p. 72.
26 I id. 3.
27 Id., Preface, p. x.
28
Johnson retracted his error contained in a comment concerning James Wilson
of Pennsylvania.
We have already referred to Henry Lee's volume in defense of Light-horse Harry
Lee. Seep. 136, supra.
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to correct himself was most assuredly not to be construed as a servile
yielding to villification and abuse. Where he felt himself unjustly
attacked he struck back with incisive force.
Admirers of Count Pulaski took offense at Johnson's statement that·
it was "a melancholy fact of which few were informed, that the cele·brated count who commanded the patrol at Germantown was found
by Washington himself asleep in a farmhouse. 29 There appeared an
anonymous pamphlet by an author assumed to have been one Bentalou,
who claimed to be an eye-witness. The pamphlet, entitled Pulaski
Vindicated from an unsupported charge, inconsiderately or malignantly
introduced in Judge Johnson?s Sketches of the Life and Correspondence
It was claimed that Johnson erred in charging Lord Rawdon, on the authority of
a letter of John Rutledge, (vol. 2, p. 471) with the burning of General Richardson's
house and turning out his widow and family-whereas Tarlton had committed the outrage. 17 S.C. HIST. AND GEN. MAG. 146 (1916).
Jared Sparks asserted. that Johnson's treatment of Samuel Gorton was a "misconception." 15 N. AM. REv. 416 at 420 (1822). Sparks also discussed Johnson's
handling of Gouverneur Morris at some length in l LIFE .AND WRITINGS OF
GoUVERNEUR MORRIS 250-255 (1832). He refutes Johnson's suggestion that
Morris was the author of the Newburgh Letters which were distributed to the Continental Army in 1783 and were calculated to arouse discontent. (Major General Armstrong later admitted their authorship.) He also denied that Morris had advocated an
absolute monarchy for America.
An acrid review appeared in the I UNITED STATES MAGAZINE l at 33 (1823)
which considered Johnson's slur upon Morris in unrestrained language. The reviewer
also challenged Johnson's "slander'' of Conway who was alleged to have conspired against
George Washington as Commander-in-Chief and ·termed it as "an impudent and vile
falsehood from beginning to end." Id. at zo. Johnson's version of the Conway cabal
has been sustained by later historians.
Edward McCrady, Johnson's grand-nephew, many years later took Johnson to
task for what he had writ.ten on the subject of General Sumter's role in the war remarking that if Johnson had had the full correspondence before him "he might have
modified some of his strictures upon Sumter and have been persuaded that his hero,
General Greene, was not always in the right, nor Sumter so much in the wrong."
THE HISTORY OF SouTH CAROLINA IN THE REVOLUTION, 1780-1783, p. 56, note
(1902).
James M;idison wrote to Johnson on May 6, 1825: " .•• The mass of information
which it has brought into view more especially with respect to the great Southern section
of the Revolutionary war, must be acceptable to all who justly appreciate the signal
importance of its operations, and the splendid career of the patriotic Hero who conducted them; whilst a rich contribution is made by the work to the funds of the general
historian of the Revolutionary period.
"If errors of any sort had found their way into its pages, and be made to appear,
your preface, which anitcipates the possibility of them, pledges only, what would be
ensured by your love of truth, that they will be turned to the proper account of improving the text of a future edition. 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 489 (1865). On June 5, 1824 he had written to H. Lee in regard to Lee's
book and clearly avoided an opinion which would put him in Lee's camp. Id.- 441 at
443. See also letter to Jefferson of June 27, 1823, infra, p. 136.
29 l WILLIAM JOHNSON 83.
.
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of General Greene was published in Baltimore in I824. It was favorably reviewed by the North American Review, the reviewer siding
with Pulaski's defender. Johnson angrily joined issue by publishing a
pamphlet entitled, Remarks-Critical and Historical on an Article in
the 47th Number of the North American Review relating to Count
Pulaski addressed to the Readers of the North American Review by
the author of the Sketches of the Life of Greene.80 The reply consisted
of some thirty-seven closely printed pages, charging that the review
was merely an echo of Bentalou's pamphlet. This was induced, Johnson declared in the opening paragraph, by the attempt of the conductors of the North American Review to give publicity and credit to the
Pulaski pamphlet, which compelled Johnson "however reluctant to
come once more before the public." 81
Johnson had, indeed, once resolved that nothing more would occur
to force him into controversies in the public prints-to him "the most
disgusting of all necessities"; 82 but it is the lot of one who dares to
speak with candor that he is "not permitted to rest a moment." 83 Yet
he held the press in high regard. In his Introduction to his Life of
Greene he had written: "I feel no compunction, in hastening by my
example, the time when the press shall govern the· world, provided,
that candour, benevolence and urbanity, shall govern the press." 34 In
a letter to Thomas Cooper which appeared in the City Gazette and
8
° Charleston, 1825. The correctness of Johnson's idea that Sparks was behind
the review appears from the fact that Sparks later published the "Life of Count
Pulaski" in the AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY (N.S.) (1833) in which he relies on Bentalou's
pamphlet and credits him with being a member of Pulaski's legion. (Id. 367.) Also
id. 420-421 where the Germantown incident is discussed.
A preliminary book notice had warned that Johnson had "spoken with severity
of the conduct of the celebrated Polish Count Pulaski" and announced that a friend had
come forward to vindicate him, and "prove the mistake of the biographer of Greene."
20 N. AM. REv. 237 (1825). In the review referred to in the text the author took
pains to contrast Johnson's supposed attitude toward Pulaski with that of the other
· citizens of Charlestown. (Id. 375 at 388.) Attention was called to the fact that Washington had promoted Pulaski after the time at which the incident was supposed to have
taken place. The conclusion was that Johnson "had been deceived, and that the authority on which he relied, from whatever source it cam~, is not entitled to credit.•••"

I~d39~
81

-

REMARKs-CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL ON AN ARTICLE IN THE 47TH NUMBER
OF THE NoRTH AMERICAN REVIEW RELATING To CouNT PULASKI ADDRESSED To THE
READERS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW BY THE AUTHOR OF THE SKETCHES OF
THE LIFE OF GREENE 3 ( Charleston, l 8 25).
82
Pamphlet entitled To THE PUBLIC OF CHARLESTON 8 (Charleston, 1882).
88
Id. p. 8.
84
l WILLIAM JOHNSON xi. "As to Judge Johnson.-if he thinks that these
numbers are written from jealousy of him, or from malice, or any bad motive, he is
exactly in the error into which he so often precipitates himself in his newspaper controversies." From CAROLINIENSIS 63 (Charleston, 1823), a pamphlet in the possession

140

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

Commercial Advertiser of Charleston on April 9, 1823 he declared:
"I venerate the freedom of the press; I solemnly believe it to be the
palladium of freedom. He, therefore, who deprives it of public respect
and confidence, by prostituting it to the purpose of private malice, is a
bad citizen and ought to be punished. . . . When I say the liberty of the
press, I would be understood to mean its unrestrained capacity to disseminate information and discuss principles and measures. I am far
from intending the present shameless abuses to which it is applied, and
which are no more like a rational idea of its freedom, than anarchy is
like liberty. If ever the American people become disgusted with their
freedom, that disgust will be produced by the licentiousness and abuse
of the press."
Johnson was not convinced that Bentalou was an eye-witness. He
was satisfied, however, that the attacks had more in them than a love
for the Polish Count-that here was a convenient form of aggression:
"I here take leave of the subject. I am fully sensible of the delicacy of
the undertaking that I have ventured upon: But if I have erred, let it
be remembered how difficult it is -to know how to act when one sustains
these public and pointed attacks. When they are left unnoticed, too
many will suppose they could not be repelled, and the same presses
through which they are made or aided will not fail to convert silence
into shame or confusion: Some will think I have gone too far in criticizing the review as it relates to the general actions of Pulaski. On this
subject a defence of an invidious nature has been forced upon me, since
the extravagant and false accounts of these writers were intended only
to exasperate public feeling to a higher pitch. They have drawn out
all that has here been said, by setting up services and claims which
Pulaski himself, had he been in life, would never have pretended to." 85
That Johnson felt he was writing history as he saw it without prejudice
against Pulaski is indicated by the fact that some years earlier he had
spoken in one of his orations of "the desolate plains of weeping Poland . • .," remarking with sympathy that "in vain had Kosciusko and
the Pulaskis breasted the torrent that Russia poured upon their
country." 86
of the New York Pubic Library, (pages 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, missing), consisting of numbers
originally appearing in the CHARLESTON MERCURY.
85 REMARKS-CRITICAL AND ;HISTORICAL ON AN ARTICLE IN THE 47TH-NUMBER
OF THE NoRTH AMERICAN REVIEW RELATING TO CouNT PULASKI ADDRESSED TO THE
READERS oF THE NoRTH AMERIC~N REVIEW BY THE AUTHOR OF THE SKETCHES OF
THE LIFE OF GREENE 36 (Charleston, 1825).
86 Oration delivered at St. Phillips Church, Charleston, July 4, 1812, p. 18.
Printed in pamphlet form at Charleston in l 8 I 3.
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D. The Historical Setting of the Publication of the Life of Greene
The publication of the Life of Greene was preceded and followed
. by much social tension. It was a dynamic and explosive period for the
young nation in which all actors were unusually stimulated. Johnson,
as a creative dissenter, came in for more than his share of criticism on
the one hand and anxiety on the other. Had he not been able to fight
back he would have been unable to function. Not only did he have to
endure the arduous task of being a circuit rider and Supreme Court
Justice but he had also to perform his work under the most trying
mental circumstance-that of knowing that the majority of the people
of Charleston and South Carolina disapproved of his strong devotion
to the federal Constitution, notwithstanding his very fair attitude toward states' rights. It was at this period that he found himself plunged
into the midst of the nullification controversy and the slavery question with all of its anti-negro concomitants.87 All of the hotly debated
questions of the day divided themselves into federal and state rivalry,
somehow or other, as the political camps between which the aggressive
wars of politics were to be waged. His views furnished ample irritation
to the less understanding fellow citizens among whom he had lived and
grown. On the other side, the provocation was often bitter and threatening, whereas a general survey of Johnson's advanced thinking and
the principles for which he stood causes one to be impressed by his selfcontrol rather than by his lack of it. It must always be remembered
in any attempt to appraise Johnson as a man and a jurist that he was at
the beginning of things and did not consider that his life was but an
outcropping of ages of mental geology. He was well aware of the universal resistance to the advancement of man through knowledge which
characterized both primitive and so-called cultured society.

II

JOHNSON's CONTROVERSY WITH THOMAS

COOPER

A. Cooper's Attack Upon Johnson
One of the harshest and most caustic of controversies was that which
appears to have been engendered by Thomas Cooper, then President of
South Carolina College. Cooper was an Englishman who had come
here with Joseph Priestley, the scientist and philosopher. He became
87
This subject is further discussed at p. 148 infra, where the case of Elkison v.
Deliessine, 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4,366 (1823), is considered. See also Levin, "Mr. Justice
William Johnson, Creative Dissenter," 43 MxcH. L. REv. 4:97 at 498 (1944).
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president-judge of one of the Pennsylvania districts but was ousted because of alleged acts affecting his qualifications for the office. He became a teacher of science and law at the University of ;virginia and
eventually found his way to South Carolina. He was a chemist, natural
scientist, jurist, politicaf economist, educator and agitator par excellence.
His views, violently anti-federal, were bas-ed upon the strong emotional
belief in state sovereignty, so that his opposition to Johnson may be
explained upon more than the one ground. Unlike Johnson, he was
continually stormy and vituperative. Though brilliant, and possessed
of a powerful creative impulse, he lacked Johnson's capacity to maintain his thinking upon a level of r<?ality.
Dumas Malone, who wrote a biography of Cooper, recounts the
events which led to a bitter public controversy between Cooper and
Johnson. "Justice Johnson," says Malone, "in a letter to a committee
on public education appointed by the legislature of Kentucky, had
stated that Cooper favored the withdrawal of funds from the common
school system of South Carolina and their application to the college. It
duly appeared that Johnson had based. his opinion upon statements
contained in an anonymous pamphlet which he thought Cooper wrote
and of which he claimed to the very end that Cooper at least approved."
,, Malone tells us that Cooper had written "a most undignified letter"
which he had seen fit to publish in the City Gaze.tte of Charleston on
March 8, r823 attac~ng not only Johnson's views but also his ability
as an hil?torian- 38 this, of course, had reference to the Life of Greene.
But Johnson's promise to joyfully acknowledge error did n.ot include
submissive acceptance of this kind of undeserved and demagogic
assault. Authors were not obliged to permit their creative efforts to be
-subjected to the sole test of the intensity of the critic's aggressions. The
contemporary poet Shelley put it tersely in his reply to reviewers in
Lines To A Reviewer:
"There is no sport in hate where all the rage
Is on one side.•.•"
Johnson's reply in ,The Charleston City Gazette on the subject of
Cooper's letter was not subdued by judicial restraint. He referred to
88 MALONE, THE PUBLIC LIFE OF THOMAS COOPER, 1783-1839, PP· 267, 272,
285, 286 (1926). See also United States v. Cooper, 25 Fed. Cas. 14,865 (1857),

which was a trial in the District Court of Pennsylvania on an indictment against
Cooper under the Sedition Act for libel against John Adams, then President of the
United States. A note on the life and character of Cooper is appended to the report
of the case. Cooper was later tried by the Board of Trustees of South Carolina College
on Dec. 3, 1832.
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Cooper's letter as "a fou!-mouthed publication"; he wrote that "the
cushion on the head of Falstaff, would as soon have created him King
of England, as the title of President of a College, make a liberal critic
of Thomas Cooper, M.D."; this was but an "ingenious fetch, a poor
attempt at arraying on the side of your vindictive feelings, the unkind
impressions which you still supposed remaining from two previous controversies in which you knew that I have been involved.... Mere artifice, mere cunning is a low and animal quality•••. the polecat or rat,
the savage or the maniac, would far outdo a host of titular M.D.'s in
the exercise of this quality." We do not set this out as a sample of the
invective of which Johnson was capable but rather- because of the nature of his basis of counter-attack. His complaint against Cooper was
based on his resort to "artifice" and "cunning." This is precisely what
Johnson had condemned and avoided in his judicial conduct and in his
official and historical writings. He was endowed with an unusual and
extraordinary capacity for being always keen to sense the hypocritical,
the distorted and the unreal. It was this sensitivity usually found in artists which enabled him to pierce artificiality and caused him to abhor
cunning. The insidious attack was a revulsion to him: "· .. the contusions of a beetle-head are not easily mistaken for the neat passes of a
skilful swordsman." He charged that Cooper had written to him "in
a style that could only have been expected from the vulgarity of a
porter, or a nymph of Billingsgate." 39 As we have said elsewhere,
"Johnson felt himself a protagonist of a great movement in history,
and he was intentionally impatient with obscurities, legal or otherwise,
which would unduly suppress the underlying dynamic forces which
were seeking expression. As a historian he found that strong statements
and courageous action had in the past been called for ...." 40 That he
showed the same trait in controversy should not surprise us.
B. Airing of Religious Views

In a letter to Thomas Jefferson, dated June 27, 1823, James Madison seem·ed somewhat vexed by what must have appeared to the milder
Madison as Johnson's propensity for recklessness. He wrote:
"I wish the rather, that the Judge may be put on his guard,
because, with all his good qualities, he has been betrayed into
89

CHARLESTON CITY GAZETTE AND COMMERCIAL DAILY ADVERTISER, April

8

9, 1823.
·
40
Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson, Creative Dissenter," 43 MicH. L. REv.
497 at 532 (1944).
and
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errors which shew that his discretion is not always awake. A remarkable instance in his ascribing to Gouverneur Morris 41 the
Newburg letters written by Armstrong, which has drawn from the
latter a corrosive attack, which must pain his feelings, if it should
not affect his standing with the public. Anoth_er appears in a stroke
at Judge Cooper, in a letter to the Education Committee in Kentucky, which has plunged him into an envenomed dispute with an
antagonist, the force of whose mind and pen you well know.
And what is worse than all, I perceive from one of Cooper's publications, casually falling within my notice, that, among the effects
of Judge Johnson's excitement he has stooped to invoke the religious prejudices circulated against Cooper." 42
Regardless of the incident which may have led to the clash,
Cooper's letter of March 8th, I 823 had charged to Johnson the authorship of the pamphlet which challenged the religious beliefs which
Cooper held in common with Priestley. Whether Madison was accepting Cooper's charge of authorship of the pamphlet or whether he was
referring to Johnson's reply-in which Johnson had stated that he
could have substantiated a charge of atheism against Cooper had he
wished to resort to such tactics-is not clear from Madison's letter. The
conventional historical approach might attempt to fix the cause or the
blame and, perhaps, would retrospectively give bias to past events by
projecting backwards the historian's own standards of conduct to former
times. We prefer to notice the quantity of affect exploded in the
struggle of the two forceful dissenters. Newspaper and pamphlet controversies were conducted as highly personal affairs. As the duel was
passing out, one wielded a newspaper column or pamphlet instead of a
sword-or possibly brought a libel suit. This was a period of transition
when physical combativeness as a means of settling personal differences
was receding as the accepted norm. Th:e duel, however, had not yet
passed from the minds and memories of the people and, indeed, though
increasingly less common, was still a means of settling affairs of honor.
Hence, Johnson's reference to "the skilful swordsman" expresses a dislike of the artificiality of hypocrisy and a preference for the more direct
41

See supra, note 28.
3 LE'ITERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 323 at 324 (1865).
On Jan. 5, 1823 Madison had written to Cooper commenting favorably on Cooper's
"Report" of the state of South Carolina College. The letter speaks of his "adversary''
and contains the following sentence: "The triumphs of education under your auspices
may_prove an antidote to the ambition which would monopolize the fountains of knowledge, which is another name for power." Id. 291. Whether or not this refers to Johnson
is not clear.
42
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appeal. Johnson never pretended that he would shrink from "justifiable retaliation." 48 He knew well-to use his own words-that "war
is but a suit by the sword." The "big stick" is-as we all should know
--only a forcible means of persuasion.
Johnson had been one of the lone figures in the early years of the
experiment of the American Revolution. He had the insight to see and
understand some of the emotive changes which were in the process of
creation and expression. From the very first he met opposition from
Chief Justice Marshall and his associates on the Bench. He lost his
friend Jefferson for a time when he had courage t!) oppose him. His
political views were not favored in his own community. His Life of
Greene, which served as an emotional outlet through his reliving the
events and men of the Revolution and through which he was able from
time to time to forget the immediate strife of the present, was bitterly
attacked as soon as published. His anti-nullification stand rendered his
very life unsafe in South Carolina; indeed, throughout the South some
of his views were almost completely taboo. While the North was more
inclined to accept him, nevertheless, his modern and advanced thinking
and his insistence on the recognition of state function invited criticism
and resentment there also. Johnson was emotionally between at least
two fires: he found no real haven of rest in either camp. Johnson's
attempt to see ahead of his time had admittedly caused him great
anxiety. He had challenged the narrow concepts of superstition
whether found in law or in science or religion. While he saw through
the pretexts of some religious practices he felt that religion could be
an instrument of benevolence and for that reason he held fast to the
idea of religious liberty. 44 When his humanitarian idea of religion was
48
I WILLIAM JoHNSON 5. Humphrey W. Woolrych says of the times in which
the notorious Chief Justice and Lord High Chancellor lived, under the reigns of
Charles II and James II: " ••• the fact was, that men of that day had adopted a
system of mutual abuse and recrimination." WooLRYCH, THE LIFE OF JuDGE JEFF-

REYS

103 (1852).
•
In the concluding paragraph of his LIFE OF GREENE he asserted that the
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religion of the Quakers (Greene was a Quaker) was really the political religion of the
United States-"Universal benevolence, and unbounded toleration, were the favorite
doctrines; • • • " He also spoke of Greene's early discrimination "between religion
and the dogmas which sectarians have grafted upon it.•••" z WILLIAM JoHNSON
464- Speaking of Greene he said: "His stern integrity and devotion to religious and
political liberty he had acquired in a country planted by the victims or the exiles of
persecution. • • ." I id. z.
"The State of Rhode Island was originally settled by religious sectarians, who
sought in the wilderness, for that freedom of conscience, or of speculation which was
denied them in the parent colony of Massachusetts. Although the settlers of the latter
colony had fled from the persecutions which disgraced England in the commencement
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threatened at a most critical period of his life it was too much for
.composure.

C. E'lJaluation of the Methods of Science
While Johnson may be considered as our first scientific jurist he
was not led astray by the sense of power which often was exerted through
its uses. This would have been· expected of a Franklin but of a jurist
who once practiced partisan law this was nothing short of astonishing.
In his letter to Cooper of April 9th, I 823 he admonished the scientist
who did.not understand the true meaning of science: "The region of
arrogan~e, sir, lies just within the threshold of science. Locke and
Newton advanced in her temple upon bended knees; and a greater man
than Mr. Cooper, M. D. has observed 'that he just knew enough to
know that he knew nothing at all!' If the veriest insect that crawls,
or any single blade of grass that bends beneath our feet, cannot teach
us humility, nothing can." 45 Tyranny in any form was obnoxious, and
surely it was to be deplored "that science tyrannizes over genius. The
most brilliant achievement, unless obtained by the rules of art, is not
permitted to establish the reputation of the performer, lest it should
detract from that of the learned theorist. There .are thousands,' who
must ever limp after the rapid conclusions of genius, and quick movements of bold and decisive minds, who will yet be supported in their
reveries by tens of thousands of others, merely because the latter can
best folJow the views and actions of the lower orders of genius." 46
of the seventeenth century, yet scarcely had they effected a settlement in their place
of refuge, before they exhibited an additional proof that fanaticism, whether in a city
or in a wilderness, is still cruel, selfish, and tyrannical; or that the corrupting influence
of power may taint even the purity of the Christian religion." Id. 4.
Speaking of Baron Granville of Potheridge, Johnson called him a fanatic and.
criticized the Church of England for the "infamous test-act" of 1703 adding that he
was aided by "a society which masked an attack upon religious freedom under the
specious pretext of promoting religion. How often has that sacred name been polluted
by the avarice or ambition of man! But he is no friend to religion who will tempt
.man to hypocracy, deprive him of the sacred right of conscience, or withdraw the
oracles of the Christian religion from the severest scrutiny that the human mind can
be subjected to." He then added; "It is the service of man and of a sect; and not
of Him to whom nothing but the sacrifice of a willing heart can be acceptable; and
who, having given conscience and reason to man, must see his purposes thwarted and
his servic~s profaned, whenever one sect shall, in his name, deprive another of the
free exercise of these noJ:,lest attributes of being created to serve him." Id. 244 and
245. {Italics the writer's.)
·
45
CHARLESTON CITY GAZETTE AND CoMMERCIAL ADVERTISER, April 9, 1823.
46 l WILLIAM JOHNSON 373. Lowie relates that Semmelweis, who suggested and
statistically proved, that childbed fever might be caused by the infection spread by the
doctor's hand, -lost his position as assistant professor, was persecuted by his profession
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The "genius" to Johnson was not the mystically endowed magician or
miracle worker but rather the one who was capable of creative dissent,
one who was not compulsively thwarted by the rules.
Rules, according to Johnson, were to be guides and not barricades.
He did not realize then what is better known today that what we call
"genius" is often, in substantial part, the psychological result, often distorted, of a too repressive society; that much which "genius" achieves
could in time be removed from the sphere of unknowing mental conflict. A good deal of the mental energy now devoted to the task of
accomplishing conformity could well be applied toward a better and
more widespread understanding of how we all function psychodynamand driven to insanity by such eminent scientists as Virchow, Scanzoni, Von Siebold
and others "who misunderstood, lied and slandered." RoBERT H. LowJE, ARE WE
CIVILIZED 258 (1929). Here Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes published his essay, "Contagiousness of Puerperal Fever" in 1843 and was subjected to "bitter personal abuse."
John Torry Morse, Jr., II ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 14th ed., 677 (1932).
Benjamin• Franklin's scientific works on electricity ·were laughed at "by the
connoisseurs" and because he dreaded the "ridicule which too commonly attends unsuccessful attempts in science, he communicated his intended experiment to nobody
but his son." CARL VAN DoREN, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 162, 164 (1941), quoting
contemporary writing.
In a milder but related form the unscientific adherence of scientists to a mystic
conception of science as being something apart from the human being is a type of
scientific aggression. We call attention here to the pertinence of a reply of George A.
Lundberg of the University of Washington to J. T. Shotwell's statement that "the
technique of the physical sciences is quite different from that of the political sciences
which do not have mathematics as the base." ["The Control of Atomic Energy under
the Charter," AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SocIETY, SYMPOSIUM ON ATOMIC ENERGY
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ( 1946)]. It is significant to note here that Shotwell's conception is an excluding one by which that which he has found becomes isolated from other
scientific data. This is an unconscious "superiority'' psychodynamism which has no place
in science since it sets up a barrier to further inquiry and is a type of aggression. Such an
excluding mechanism, indeed, does, in a psychological sense, work mathematically or
geometrically and, not unlike a spite fence, excludes the view of a neighbor. Indeed,
the mind is the dynamic origin of mathematics! Mr. Lundberg characterizes Shotwell's
view, among others, correctly as one of the "hoary platitudes of history and 'social
science' of the last century," and goes on to say: "In this attitude, we have perhaps·
a greater menace than in the atomic bomb itself; for the assumption of the inapplicability of the methods of natural science, including mathematics, to man's social behavior
closes the principal avenue along which lies our last, best hope. I suspect that sooner
or later some scientists of the caliber represented in this symposium will become disgusted with' the idea that social, as contrasted with physical, problems require for
their solution not serious and fundamental research like that underlying the bomb,
but are to be approached instead only by debate, charters, and, at most, a diligent
study of the fragments of selected 'history.' When this time comes, perhaps they
will propose a two-billion-dollar research project for a more fundamental inquiry
into the nature of social relations than has hitherto been considered." 246 THE
ANNALS 152 (1946).
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ically. With such knowledge attained, many easy avenues of superstition would automatically become closed and progressive relinquishment
of primitive fears would follow. The overprotection against assumed
dangers leads into a vicious circle. The fears cause one to choose a
fixed pattern of race, creed, law, or science and thereafter continue to
maintain the isolation for security reasons. Dissenting concepts disturb
the hypothetical feeling of security when none really exists. Choice,
which is the very purpose of democracy, is not possible in a mind which
is trained in incapability. Without such changes the mind of man is
hardly prepared for the responsibilities of the atomic age. The real
scientist does not worship his hypotheses but rather seeks solutions of
the complex problems of the world by the choice and use of principles,
their acceptance and rejection on an adult level.
Johnson did not reject science; nor did he accept it as an alternative
for superstition. There was no authority in science to rule by supererogation. 47 Because he examined science critically he was truly scientific. "The early insight of Mr. Justice Johnson," to which Mr. Justice
Frankfurter recently referred, 48 went beyond the scope of jurisprudence.

III
THE ELKISON CASE

A. Understa;nding of the Dynamics of
Controversy Necessary

We must, therefore, read what this man of insight said and did
which reflected his attempt to resolve what he saw better than others
into a reality meaning. Thus it is that we learn about the nature of the
47 For further discussion of Johnson's interest in science see Levin, "Mr. Justice
William Johnson, Creative_Dissenter," 43 MICH. L. REv. 497 at 538 et seq. (1944); and
on science and magic by the same author, "Mr. Justice William Johnson and the
Common Incidents of Life: II," 44 MicH. L. REV. 243 at 288 et seq. (1945).
The opposite view to that of Johnson on the subject of genius was expressed by
his brilliant contemporary, the Scottish philosopher, Dr. Thomas Reid who declared
"it is genius, and not the want of it, that adulterates science and fills it with error
and false theory; • • • the treasures of knowledge, altliough commonly buried deep,
may be reached by ·those drudges who can dig with labour and patience, though they
have not wings to fly." Quoted by Dugald Stewart, ''Essay on the Sublime," PHILOSOPHICAL EssAYs, Am .. ed., 392 (18u). Stewart disagrees with Reid. Dr. Reid's
statement is more in accord with psychodynamic progress as an ultimate objective since
it envisages a gen~ral improvement of the level of understanding. We believe that
Johnson thought of genius in terms of a strong creative desire to dissent. Reid perceived of strong dissent as something which should be unnecessary. Both views require
considerable supplementation. 48 From the opinion in the recent case of East New York Savings v. Hahn,
326 U.S. 230 at 231, 66 S. Ct. 69 (1945).
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judicial and legal processes by studying reactions of such a man to his
environment. The temptation to ascribe the "genius" of Johnson or
Greene to heredity or innate traits is always alluring and an easy
way out of difficulty in understanding. Johnson himself spoke of the
importance of the child's training as bearing upon his later capacity
to think and judge. If there is a selective foundation well laid the
mind with the creative impulse will inevitably find that conflicts with
less capable minds-incapable largely because of poor training-will
arise continually. This clash with majority inertia will be inevitable.
To strike at oppression then becomes a means of sustaining the integrity
of such a position since the oppressed are not willingly understood by
the majority. Such was the case with General Greene's father of whom
Johnson said that "the very name oppression, struck upon a chord that
vibrated to every heart." 49 Johnson could not have written these words
unless he had relived Greene's emotional struggle within himselfunless he identified with the oppressed as a dynamic force representing
individualism.
As he identified with the father he also identified with the son. He
attributed much of the persecution of General Greene to "the party
who considered every friend of Washington as the enemy of themselves." His discussion of Benedict Arnold emphasizes not only this
General's villainy but "the fearful instability of human virtue." He
did not brand Arnold as an hereditary or congenital traitor. With much
insight he understood what an environment of persecution and indignity had done to Arnold's character-"perhaps his case presents an
instance of the demoralizing effects of persecution, even upon sound
principles. The most timid animal becomes terrible under the influence
of despair." But he saw in Arnold what he hated in anybody: " . . . Arnold was a hypocrite,-a description of men who are capable of the
vilest actions, and incapable of reformation, because their dis~inguishing
vice is founded in meanness and practical falsehood." 50 What he hated
in Thomas Cooper he hated in Arnold.
We may take leave for the moment of Johnson's venture into biography and history with the words of Jefferson addressed to him on
March 4, 1823. Jefferson had become reconciled to Johnson and saw
in him the reason for the original confidence he had reposed in the
young lawyer from Charleston when he appointed him Supreme Court
Justice. Jefferson, then an old man, consoled Johnson when critics
_attacked his Life of Greene. He assured him that he need not fear
49
l!O

I
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Id. 199.

17.
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'~these insects" and proceeded to give Johnson an unequivocally superior place in American history writing. "What you 'write," wrote
Jefferson, "will be far above their grovelling sphere." 51
Our brief account of the controversies aroused by Johnson's Life
. of Greene is not meant as an aimless relation of facts. The purpose
has been to point out how the effective and dynamic outlook of Greene's
biographer shot through every phase not only of Johnson's life but the
very social existence of the new democracy. Here we see the individual
as the nucleus of political and legal relationships and activities-how,
what 'Marret has called the two-sided process of taking_ in and giving
out, actually is at work in the making of law. 52 In his Life of Greene we
find not only traces of psychodynamic identifications with Greene and
the events of the past but also brief comments on psychological processes, a brief summary of the history of parties, am,hropological data,
and Johnson's expression of individual freedom as the aim of all
government, be it state or federal. Thus, it is a source book of Johnson's jurisprudence and furnishes material for the better understanding
of his constitutional and political views. Here,. as elsewhere, we find
many evidences of that omnipresent ambivilence which in a few words
suggests that "ip.dividual liberty is the aim of all government; but
· cooperation, that is, federative control is required to prevent the imposition of the despotism of man over man." The events described in
the following pages will indicate how deeply Johnson felt on these
subjects. He stands out as one of the most eminent American politicians and jurists in our history because consciously and unconsciously
he understood this relationship, whereas others had not passed beyond
the blind impulse of misdirected aggression as the inevitable course
of political activity.
'
Johnson has received praise-justly earned-for his persistent
boldness in support of an independent judi~ary. But independence
alone couid not sustain such ~ncomiums for long; for ruthless inde51
IO FoRD, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 246 at 247 (1892).
The following appears in Johnson's letter to Cooper printed in the CHARLESTON
CITY GAZETTE AND COMMERCIAL ADVERTISER of April 8, 1823: " ••• I will beg
leave to introduce to your notice an extract of a very recent letter froin a man at whose
name one half of the M.Ds. of your standing would (cower' and 'quail.' "
_ "A reviewer;'' says he, (and the same may be said of many a pedant reader) "can
never let a work pass uncensured; he must always make himself wiser than his author.
He would otherwise think it an abdication of his office of Censor. Do not fear these
insects." This is the same quotation referred to in the text and appears in the letter
from Jefferson to Johnson dated March 4, 1823.
52
See Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Common Incidents of Life:
II," 44 M1cH. L. ;R.Ev. 243 at 276, note 176 (1945) quoting from 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BR1TTANICA, 14th ed., 41 at 44 (1932).
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pendence is but degrees removed from ruthless anarchy. Johnson opposed the despotism and tyranny of individuals over their fellow men
as vehemently as he defended the right of the judiciary to its unfettered
individualism. Johnson's independence was outstanding rather because
it stood for an independent mind freed from these anti-social prejudices
which mean ultimately the denial of law. We shall now see with what
stout integrity and determination he sought an answer to what seemed
to be the antinomy of state and federal cooperation, how he became
the focal point of attack in events which foreshadowed the Civil War.

B. The Persistence of Revolutionary Tensions
American history remains yet to be written.158 Surely, this is true
of the nullification controversies both in the North and in the South.
Slavery and race were but incidents of more dynamic causes which are
not explained by using the word "economic" as an over-all summation
of conflicting forces. We would have to take into account all factors
of psychodynamic processes, training, environment and social patterning; nor could we ignore the very obvious fact that the mental aggressions against England which had been practiced by the Colonists,
and which were many times accentuated during the Revolutionary War,
had not yet been displaced into socially constructive channels. The
precedent of rebellion was there and continued in all possible domestic
avenues. Jared Sparks in his review of Johnson's Life of Greene supplies us with the evidence of a state of continued aggression comparable
to the tenseness which pervades a group participating in a riot:
" . . • The war in the south was conducted in a manner to give
rise to feelings, of which the people of New England can form no
conception. Fortunately for the cause of freedom, the struggle
58 Some of the factors overlooked are implied in the comment of Gerald W.
Johnson on James Madison. "It is nothing uncommon for men to continue revising
their intellectual attitudes into extreme old age, but a man's emotional attitudes are
usually fixed long before he is twenty-five. To that order of sociey into which he
is born a boy attributes an authority and a legitimacy greater than he can ascribe
to any order subsequently established; his reason may tell him that the new order is
right, and he may act all his life to the dictates of his reason, but his emotional side
will always cherish secret doubts which may hinder and hamper his action." AMERICA'S

SILVER AGE

58 (1939),

The author, however, overlooks the tremendous possibilities of revaluing events
in the past when he says: "Conditions that faced the Revolutionists have never been
repeated and it is hard to imagine that they can ever be duplicated in the future .•••
Therefore, while the actual deeds of Jefferson, Hamilton, Madison and the others
constitute the basis of our national history, interest in their methods is somewhat
academic, since those methods are hardly likely to be useful again unless the conditions
that made them valid are reproduced." Id. 107.
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commenced in a quart~r, where the voice of liberty may be said to
have been unanimous. The very small number among us who,
from motives of interest or affection, adhered to the royal cause,
either retired, or maintained a prudent silence. One spirit. pervaded
the community; one object, the expulsion.of the common enemy,
gave vigor to every arm. This object accomplished, the passions,
wliich had been excited by the contest, subsided; the flame of resentment was extinguished, and the odious appelatives of whig and
tory, were soon forgotten in the interesting events which succeeded. In the south, the case was far different. Whether it was owing
to the nature of their connection with the mother country, or to accidental circumstances, certain it is, that in the more southern colonies from the commencement of the dispute, parties were much
more equally poised. In several prpvinces the loyalists nearly outnumbered the whigs, and in all, they formed a numerous and formidable body. Mutual recrimination soon led to more fatal consequences, and in some districts, before the. British troops made
their appearance, the contest had already assumed the frightful
features of civil war. The enemy did not fail to foment these unhappy divisions, and the rage of the combatants was at length inflamed to the degree, that it seemed as if these miserable people
were doomed to be exterminated by the hands of each other.
Neighbor was armed against neighbor, and in some instances members of the same family looked upon each other with s~picion and
hatred. The return of peace could not bring with it immediate oblivion, to minds which hail been agitated by such passions. The
lurking poisori still rankled in the bosoms of both parties, and excited jealousies which are hardly yet eradicated. We have noticed
with pleasure, in some late publications in the south, from the pens
of individuals who were attached to the army, a spirit of conciliation of impartiality." 5 "'
The "savage fury" with which, according to Johnson, the whigs
and tories pursued each other was never entirely quelled. New aggressions encouraged by the old ones quickly took their place. That
is why Sparks feared even the mention by Johnson of the existence of
old sores although, after expressing a wish to be acquainted "with the
soul which animated, and the mind which directed these movements,"
he adds: "This period of our_history may be said to be still unexplored,
' and holds out allurements • ·. • ." 55
5

"'

55

15 N. AM. REV. 416 at 423, 424 (1822). (lt!LJ.ics the writer's.}
-

Id. 43.
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Johnson's independence was clearly not a pose, as one historian has
intimated. ~6 There was a personal risk involved in the courageous
opposition to the forces of disunion which were rearing their heads.
The very experiment in American democracy was at stake. The emotion
was not only intense but discordant and attached itself with equal force
to slavery, politics, states' rights, federalism, tariff-indeed, wherever
it was possible to :find differences of opinion. Unfortunately for Johnson, the "savage fury" raged worse in Charleston and South Carolina.
Political or economic or legal considerations do not adequately account
either for the varieties of conflict or the reasons why the aggressions
were :fiercest in certain areas.
What made it worse for Johnson was that this independence was
identified to no small degree with the very same dynamic forces which
were threatening to tear the union apart. The identification with states'
rights, as we have heretofore pointed out in an earlier essay, is in a
measure an identification with individual expression of power as contrasted with community or federated endeavor. Such identification,
on the positive side, has some value for society despite its ~ontrariness.
Not all of the energy of protest, as the expression of individual psychodynamic affect, can take the form of dissent. The psychodynamic process of identification enables persons to act-vicariously, to so speakin opposition to the general society. Without some such identifications
civilization would be practically impossible. But, while identification
absorbs much of the overflow of repressed energy, it also accounts for
inordinate, insensate, unreasoned and stubborn kind of opposition. Johnson identified strongly with the State of South Carolina and also with
states' rights-but not blindly. He had always recognized the state of
his birth as a symbol of individual liberty. Of her part in the Revolution he had written: "Promptly she stood forth the :first, to constitute
that body which organized opposition, and ere the general voice had
called into the action the eloquent pen of Jefferson, Carolina was already
free." n But this identification in the case of Johnson did not lead to
nullification. It brought him, rather, to the brink of despair.
56
This was the view.of John Quincy Adams. See 5 MEMOIRS OF JoHN QuINcY
ADAMS, edited by C. F. Adams, 42-43 (1875); also note 84, infra.
57
ORATION AT ST. PHILLIPS CHURCH 8 (Charleston, 1812). See also Levin,
"Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Common Incidents of Life: II," 44 MICH. L.
REv. 243 at 275 (1945), where the writer discusses the dynamics of Johnson's identification :with states' rights. There has been considerable speculation as to the causes of
the early southern spirit of democracy and independence. We quote the following
only for its value as a contemporary comment by an historian. David Ramsay, M.D.,
said concerning the Carolinians that: "Carolinians are not easily roused; when roused
they are active and ardent but not persevering. These particularities are in some
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C. The Fear of a Negro Uprising
Shortly after The Life of Greene was published Johnson rendered
his historic opinion Elkison v. Deliesseline on August 7, I823 fis in
the Circuit Court of the District of South Carolina.. Although little
heard of today, the opinion warned of the imminence of impending ,
events which were to lead first to nullification by South Carolina and
eventually to the Civil War. The case was one of a British negro
seaman who was arrested under the authority of a state act of South
Carolina entitled, "An Act for the better Regulation of free negroes
and persons of Color . . • " passed in December of I 822. 59
degree connected with a variable climate, vibrating between the extremes of heat and
cold and suddenly passing from one to the other. They are irritable in their tempers,
have a very high sense of honor, and are disposed to guard it at every hazard." 2 RAMSEY, HISTORY OF SouTH CAROLINA 228, 229 (1858). ·
See also reference to South Carolina's firm stand on independence in CARL VAN
DOREN, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 561, 562 (1941).
.
While Johnson's individualism was identified more strongly with South Carolina,
he acknowledged that neighboring North Carolina was an "early nursery of the spirit
' of 1776." I WILLIAM JoHNSON 236, and he noted that a "miniature revolution" had
taken place there in 1677. Id. 228.
The psychodynamic phenomenon of identification has received but scant attention
from historians. On the Continent, the Island of Corsica typified primitive independence and drew forth many identifications. Rousseau was led to predict that the ideal
legislator would most probably arrive from Corsica and this was interpreted to have
been fulfilled by the coming of Napoleon. While Sir Henry Maine rejected the idea,
he at the same time furnished the clue to the dynamic source of Rosseau's prediction
when he said that Rousseau shared "the general interest and sympathy which the
gallant struggle of the Corsicans for independence" had excited in his day. POPULAR
GoVERNMENT, Essay 3, p. 167 (1886). This dynamic "sharing" by "identification"
may be traced in many manifestations. It should not be difficult to conceive of an energetic liberator springing from a family of intensely liberty loving peoples, and for the
same reason, from a geographical area where liberty has become a tradition, so-to-speak.
Accordingly, dynamically viewed, it may be assumed that in the unconscious mind
of Rousseau, who thought much of these human problems, this isolated island of wildness in a European sea of conformity must have presented a picture of human striving
for liberty which he felt could not fail to develop a figure in due course of time.
Looking backward, we do not hesitate to say that Greece 'produced' Socrates, Rome
'produced' Spartacus, England 'produced' Shakespeare or that Corsica 'produced'
Napoleon. The predictive nature of such a prophesy as Rousseau made is nothing
more than a conscious and unconscious evaluation of the extent to which patterns of
liberty are desirable and may stimulate emulation. Johnson's identification with South
Carolina operated in much the same way.
58 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4,366, Brunner Col. Cas. 431, 2 Wheeler Cr. Cas. 56. The
opinion was also reported in the NILES REGISTER of September 6, 1823 and in the
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER, and was published also as a pamphlet.
59
Sec. 3 of the act read as follows: "That if any vessel shall come into any
port or harbour of this State, from any other State, or foreign port, having on board
any free negroes or persons of colour, as cooks, stewards, or mariners, or in any other
employment on board of said vessel, such free negroes or persons of colour shall be
liable to be seized and confined in gaol until such vessel shall clear put and depart
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The act had been passed after a planned negro uprising had been
detected by the information furnished by a slave on an afternoon of
May, I 822 and promptly followed by most vigorous steps for the
protection of the community. Many were arrested, some thirty-five
were sent to the gallows and a number were transported. The fear of
a slave insurrection was not new to Charleston; but it is interesting to
note that at least one writer remarks that it is said that the "abortive
earlier attempt" of 1739 was instigated by the Spaniards. The insurrection planned for Charleston for a Sunday night in June he says "was
believed to have been inspired not by foreigners but by abolitionists
in• Boston." 60
John Bach McMaster gives a fuller explanation of what inspired
the uprising: "Those who hunted down the conspirators and brought
them to the gallows attributed the plot to the influence of a free negro
of uncommon ability, to religious fanaticism, and the secession of a
large body of blacks from the white Methodist Church and the formation of an African Methodist Church, to the facilities for confederating
afforded by the extreme indulgence with which masters in Charleston
treated their slaves, and to the course which certain discussions had
lately taken in Congress." 6 1. All of the reasons given furnish too simple
from this State; and that when said vessel is ready to sail, the Captain of said vessel
shall be bound to carry away the said free negro or free person of colour, and to pay
the expenses of his destination; and in case of his neglect or refusal so to do, he shall
be liable to be indicted; and on conviction thereof shall be fined in a sum not less
than one thousand dollars, and imprisoned not less than two months; and such free
negroes or persons of colour shall be deemed and taken as absolute slaves, and sold in
conformity to the provisions of the act passed on the 20th December, l 820, aforesaid."
60
STEVENS, CHARLESTON 126 (1939). For further account of the plot and its
principal actors and its connection with the Haiti insurrection of 1791 see pp. 163-164See also for further details of the conspiracy JERVEY, RoBERT Y. HAYNE AND Hrs
TIMES 130 et seq. (1909).
In his Appendix E on Negro Slaves Johnson said: "During the whole of the
revolutionary war, it is clear that the slaves never once meditated anything like
insurrection. Indeed, it is not whilst their masters have arms in their hands that
such an event is ever to be apprehended." 2 WILLIAM JoHNSON 473.
The danger of insurrection from foreign influences had been spoken of in the
Constitutional Convention. WILLIAM GARROT BRoWN, THE LIFE OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH 155 (1905).
On the fear of a slave rebellion see discussion of the celebrated Gruber Case in
BERNARD C. STEINER, LIFE OF 'RoGER BROOKE TANEY 73 et seq. (1922). Gruber
who delivered a sermon against slavery in Washington County, Maryland in 1818 was
indicted for instigation of mutiny and rebellion and was defended by Taney who was
then in private practice.
a1. 5 McMASTER, A HrsToRY oF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES 199 et seq.
(1901). A very full account of the incident is given here.
We do not consider it too speculative to suggest that the measures taken to
protect the community were harsh in proportion to the fear of retaliation from free
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an explanation for the disturbance of relationships which had never
been on a reciprocal communicative level-and that is the condition
in large measure today.

D. The Course of the Litigation
The fear, which seems to have been founded on fact, that the negroes were being aided by their San Domingo co-conspirators is what
gave substance to the act permitting the seizure of negroes or persons
of color from vessels entering a South Carolina port. Not only was
the vessel to be boarded by the sheriff but the master was subjected
among other things to costs for detention of the person taken off the
ship. Many ships were soon affected by the seizure of stewards, cooks,
mariners and others. McMaster states that:
"The captains of the vessels at once applied for relief to the
judge of the United States District Court, who urged them to seek
redress in the courts of the State, and requested the district at, torney to lend his aid. A test case was accordingly made up, a writ
of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of the arrest of the men,
was sued out, and, the sheriff having returned that they were
arrested under the law of I 822, a motion was made for a discharge
on the ground that- the law was unconstitutional. But the lower
court decided that it was constitutional; the upper Court, on appeal, was divided, and the prisoners remained in custody of the
sheriff. Ultimately they were released; but meantime the
American captains addressed Congress, while such as were British
subjects complained to Canning [the British minister]. He remonstrated vigorously, and was assured by Adams that the practice
should be put a stop to; yet it went on, and very soon another
slaves· for having once been in slavery and the danger of arousing those yet enslaved.
Retaliation is a primitive means of psychological redress. See HANS KELSEN, NATURE
AND SocIETY (1943). Psychologically, but in reverse, this same phenomenon was a
fact which contributed to the strong insistence on states' rights; there was, in other
words, a strong identification with almost anarchical liberty, to be free of "enslavement" by the federal government. There was a fear that the people of the South
would become "slaves of a great consolidated government." 2 WARREN, THE SUPREME
CoURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 87 (1922); see also id. 384.
Gerald W. Johnson says of John C. Calhoun of South Carolina that "one of his
principles was that a nation that submits to coercion is no longer free." AMERICA'S
SILVER AGE 239 (1939). On the dynamic element of subordination in Chief Justice
Marshall's thinking see Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson, Creative Dissenter,"
43 MICH. L. REV. 497 at 544 et seq. (1944). The states' rightists feared that they
would be enslaved if they were not free to enslave; and thus federalism mirrored their
own subordination while they subordinated others.
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British subject-a negro seaman born in Jamaica-was in the
clutches of the law." 62
We rely again on McMaster for a brief and pointed summary of
the subsequent events.
"This time suit was brought in the United States District Court
for a wr.it of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, discharging the man
from confinement absolutely; or, failing this, for a writ de homine
replegiando, for his release on bail. The purpose was to try the
validity of the law under which he was held. Counsel for the
plaintiff argued that the act of 1822 was unconstitutional for two
reasons: In the first place, it violated the sole power of Congress
to regulate trade, because it interfered with the freedom of navigation and the employment of seamen, and drove from the ports of
South Carolina all ships, foreign or domestic, with free negroes
on board. In the second place, it violated the treaty with Great
Britain, by which the right to engage in commerce with the United
States was guaranteed to every British subject.
"To this the defence made answer that a sovereign State nas
the right to interdict the entry of foreigners into her dominion;
that South Carolina was a sovereign State prior to and at the time
of her entrance into the Federal compact; that her sovereign right
to exclude free negroes from other States was one she had not, and
from the peculiar circumstances of her slave population could not,
surrender to- the Federal Government; that from the very foundation of the Government each State made such laws regarding
the entry and stay of foreigners as its local policy required; that
New York and Pennsylvania had established health laws to prevent the importation of diseased men; that Massachusetts had forbidden the entry of felons and paupers of Europe; and that by
exactly the same right South Carolina had stopped the importation
of free negroes. When New York quarantined ships from South
Carolina, and made it a felony for a citizen of Charleston to leave
the quarantine ground, nobody protested. But when South Carolina confined a negro cook from New York to a particular spot in
Charleston, the cry of unconstitutionality was heard. New York
thought men from disease-infected regions dangerous to her
safety; South Carolina thought free negroes fresh from the lectures of an abolition society equally menacing to her safety and
welfare, and required them to live on a particular enclosure. Each
was exercising the right which Nature and necessity sanctioned,
62
5
(1901).

McMASTER,

A

HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES 200, 201
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and which South Carolina had no intention of relinquishing. That
the law could not be enforced without clashing with the Federal
right to regulate commerce was admitted.
"The defence were careful not to point out the fact that New
York did not charge quarantined negro sailors with board, lodging, and fees, and sell them into slavery if they could not pay.
Nevertheless, it was absolutely necessary for the State to enact the
law in question; ex necessitate, it was a power South Carolina must
and would use, and, 'if a dissolution of the Union must be the
alternative, they were ready to abide by the result.'" 63

.

.

. E. Johnson's Opinion

In the face of ~iolent opposition Johnson held the act l;lllConstitutional. He did not anticipate, it seems, the widespread storm of protest
whic;h would arise in the South as a result of his decision, nor the extent
of the acclaim which would issue from the North. He may have been
misled into a false sense of well-being because the state authorities
seemed disposed to let' the matter sleep but the South Carolina Association, spurred on by their solicitor, a Mr. Holmes, and one Colonel
Hunt, were not to be quieted. Johnson's independence of mind is here
noteworthy because he was clearly aware that "a high state of excitement existed." 6 "
Johnson's opinion was written close on the heels of the Supreme
Court's decision on February 27, 1823, on reargument, in Green v.
Bit/,dle, 65 which held the Kentucky land laws unconstitutional. Johnson dissented on the ground that Kentucky had a right under sovereignty to control her land laws and the further ground th~t ~here was no
jurisdiction. Even a superficial analysis would raise the question: How
could Johnson protect states' rights in Kentucky and deny South Carolina her slave laws? But when we place Green v. Biddle alongside his
other conceptions of the relationship between state' and federal function
we find that this opinion conformed to his idea of the functional nature
of state government which has the responsibility, within constitutional
limits, of its own internal affairs.
Open and violent opposition to the Supreme Court was considered ,
by some. ·,A high state of tension prevailed which was beginning to
· br~ak through into avowed anti-government expressions and denuncia68

Id. 201, 202.

NILES' WEEKLY REGISTER, Sept: 6, 1823, vol. 25, p. 12 (where the opinion
of Justice Johnson was quoted).
.
6 ~ 8 Wheat. (21 U. S.) I at 94 (1823).
6"
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tions. The feeling was growing that the Supreme Court had become
an instrument of the federal government to subordinate the sovereignty
of the states to the general purposes of national domination. Numerous
attacks were made upon the Supreme Court in the period which was
to follow. 66 But Johnson's opinion in Green v. Biddle, as we have already said, was not on the federalist side-it was rather in the defense
of the rights of states to administer their local affairs. The Elkison case
was another matter. There was more than a local problem involved.
National and international commerce would be affected by the acceptance of the extreme position taken by those who insisted that state
sovereignty was paramount over the very purpose of Constitutional
government.

F. Federal Power over Commerce Exclusive
Elsewhere we have quoted Johnson's praise of the Constitution
called forth in this case and his emotional and deepfelt declaration that
the Constitution was "the most wonde~ful instrument· ever drawn by
the hand of man." 67 With such feelings we would not expect him to
be lightly compromised by the serious threat of dissolution of the
Union: 68
"On the unconstitutionality of the law under which this man
is confined, it is not much to say, that it will not bear argument;
,and I feel myself sanctioned in using this strong language, from
68

For a more detailed account of the challenge to the National Judiciary see 4
BEVERIDGE, LIFE OF MARSHALL 374 et seq. (1919). A very good account of the
Elkison case is found on pp. 382 et seq. See also 2 WARREN, SUPREME CouRT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY 84 et seq. (1922).
67
See Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson, Creative Dissenter," 43 M1cH. L.
REv. 497 at 498 (1944). Quotation from Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 Fed. Cas. No.
4,366 at p. 495 (1823).
68
Mr. Holmes, the attorney for the South Carolina Association, said that he would
rather see "the pillars of government crumble in ruins." CAROLJNIENSJS 19 (Charleston, 1823). Yet the· author of CAROLINJENs1s agrees with Johnson on the habeas
corpus (id. 2 I), on the unconstitutionality of the act and the exclusive power of Congress over commerce. See id. 31. And the same writer also said: "The Constitution
of the United States, it must be remembered, resembles nothing in history, ancient
or modern. It is not a league or confederacy, because in all confederacies, the acts of
federal head bear upon States and not upon indioiduals." (Id. 5 I.)
Despite sharp differences in Charleston between Federalists and Republicans
in the early days of the Constitution they came· together in 1809 at a meeting in
St. Michael's Church and drafted a resolution of confidence in the general government and expressed their determination to "support the Union, Constitution and rights
of country." Judge Johnson was one of the Committee to draft the resolutions which
were transmitted to the President and acknowledged by him on Septemb~r 20, 1809.
THEODORE D. JERVEY, RoBERT Y. HAYNE AND His T1MEs· 29 (1909).
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considering the course of reasoning by which it has been defended.
Neither of the gentlemen has attempted to prove, that the power
therein assumed by the State, can be exercised without clashing
with the general powers of the United St!ltes to regulate commerce; but they have both strenuously contended, that ex necessitate it was a power which the state must, and would exercise; and,
-indeed, Mr. Holmes concluded his argument with the declaration,
that if a dissolution of the union must be the alternative, he was
ready to meet it. Nor did the argument of Col. Hunt deviate at
all from the same course. Giving it in the language of his own
summary, it was this: South Carolina was a sovereign State when
she adopted the constitution; a sovereign State cannot surrender
a right of vital importance; South Carolina, therefore, either did
not surrender this right, or still possesses the power to resume it,
and whether it is necessary, or when it is necessary to resume it,
she is herself the sovereign judge. But it was not necessary to
give this candid expose of the grounds which this law assumes;
for it is a subject of positive proof, that it is altogether irreconcilable with the powers of the general government; that it necessarily
compromits the public peace, and tends to embroil us with, if not
separate us from, our sister states; in short, that it leads to a dissolution of the Union, and implies a direct attack upon the
sovereignty of the United States.
" . . . If this law were· enforced upon such vessels, retaliation
would follow; and the commerce of this city, feeble and· sickly,
comparatively, as it already is, might be fatally injured. Charleston seaman, Charleston owners, Charlestown vessels, might, eo
nomine, be excluded from their commerce, or the United States
involved in war and confusion. I am far from thinking that this
power would ever be wantonly exercised, but these considerations
show its utter incompatibility with the power delegated to congress
to regulate commerce with foreign i:iations and our sister States.
". . . But the right of the general goyernment to regulate
commerce with the sister states and foreign nations, is a paramount
and exclusive right; and this conclusion we arrive at, whether we
examine it with reference to the words of the constitution, or the
nature of the grant. That this has been the received and universal
construction from the first day of the organi~ation of the general
government, is unquestionable; and the right admits not of a question any more than the fact. In the constitution of the United
States, the most wonq_erful instrument ever drawn by the hand of
m~n, there is a comprehension and precision that is unparalleled;
and I can truly say, that after spending my life in studying it, I
still daily find in it some new excellence. It is true that it contains
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no prohibition on the States to regulate foreign commerce. Nor
was such a prohibition necessary, for the words of the grant sweep
away the whole subject, and leave nothing for the states to act
upon. Wherever this is the case, there is no prohibitory clause interposed in the constitution. Thus, the States are not prohibited
from regulating the value of foreign coins, or fixing a standard of
weights and measures, for the very words imply a total unlimited
grant. The words in the present case are, 'to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the
Indian tribes.' If congress can regulate commerce, what can it not
regulate? And the navigation of ships has always been held by
all nations to appertain to commercial regulations.'~ 69

G. Commerce and Freedom of Communication
Johnson's opinion that the right of the federal government to
regulate commerce is not only paramount but also exclusive, went
farther than Marshall was willing to go-and, indeed, it has never
been followed. It foreshadowed by eight months the same position
taken later by Johnson in his separate opinion in the famous case of
Gibbons v. Ogden 70 which arose in the Nortli out of the steamboat
monopoly in the State of New York. The opinion in this latter case
was characterized by Josepth P. Cotton, Jr. as one of Johnson's most
acute opinions and more sound than Marshall's doctrine. This conclusion was reached because Johnson had reasoned that national power
was "necessarily exclusive of any residuum of power in the states,though not inconsistent with the existence of power in the states to make
any laws for the carrying out of local purposes in so far as they may
affect the objects or means of commerce, provided such laws do not
conflict with the exercise of the national power." 71 Had Marshall been
willing to concur in this far-reaching view, the federative momentum
toward better communication between constituent units might have
taken a turn toward more general cooperation. Johnson did not imply
in his view a collection of impotent states unable to manage their internal affairs; but he did see in the over-zealous adherence to and
identification with states' rights a pretended enthusiasm for local government which ultimately was psychologically reducible to inordinate
69

Elkison ;_ Deliesseline, 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4,366 at pp. 494, 495 (1823). (Italics
the writer's.)
70
9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 1 (1824).
71
Co'ITON, CoNsTITUTIONAL DECISIONS OF JoHN MARSHALL, note at p. xxxii
(1905). See Levin; "Mr. Justice William Johnson, Creative Dissenter," 43 MicH. L.
REv. 497 at 526 (1944.)
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personal aggression. In this sense the recent am;iety-laden return to
an anti-federal attitude by the very persons who were its advocates
represents a partial breakdown of communicative progress even though
partially justifie_d by fact. The basic cause is psychodynamic and not
political.
In this sense also the Constitution of the United States may be
considered by us as a document which designedly· was aimed at improvement of communication between the peoples of the "sovereign"
states, ,who were parties to the Articles of Confederation, and the group
mechanisms known as "states." The distorted communication arising
· from economic barriers, imposts and . taxes at each border was comparable to the situation cited by Dean Wigmore who recalled Voltaire's
sarcasm that a traveler in France changed his law as often as he changed
horses. 12 One may compare the situation of turmoil throughout the
world in our day with the-American experience which was in substantial
degree improved by providing free traffic and passage throughout each
state. At every level of legal and political progress there must be an
improvement in communication. The restatement of the common law
of each state undertaken by the American Law Institute serves in a
more restricted sense a similar purpose of improving communications
as does ·the adoption of a Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, a
Uniform Sales Law and others.
Freedom of speech, freedom of traffic, uniformity of language and
. 'scientific exchanges all mean a freer flow of communication. Extension
of knowledge is, likewise, ~ccelerated by the mechanical flow or interchange of ideas as by the invention of the telegraph, the telephone,
the radio and the airplane.
The significance of these inventions lies not only in the fact that
they are facilities of communication which have made knowledge available in split-second time throughout the world; they demonstrate ~ven
more forcibly that further advances in solving any problems of communication-whether in the physical world or in the study of human
behavior-must be a main objective in a troubled world.
Politics and jurisprudence are branches of the science of communication. The case of Muller v. Oregon,18 was one of the most momentous decisions ever rendered by a court of law. The decision itself
was limited in scope since it held valid a· specific Oregon wage law.
But, following close on one of Mr. Justice Holmes' dissents, t?e Court
12
18

WIGMORE, A PANORAMA OF THE Wi>RLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS 1024
208 U.S. 412, 28 S. Ct. 324 (1908).

(1928).
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in its decision broadened the scope of evidence which could be considered by a judicial body. This was done by calling in the assistance of
a rule of evidence permitting courts to take judicial notice of matters
of common knowledge. With one judicial stroke the dynamics of communication was enormously accelerated. Just as Maine had introduced
anthropological inquiry into legal science and had thereby broadened
the evidence base; and even as modern psychiatry has directed the attention of mankind to ways of learning to understand the evidence of
unconscious motivation in individual and group action; so had this
decision broken down some of the earlier exclusions and obstructions to
the freedom of communication by recognizing the right of the courts to
educe and consider evidence of all facts, whether patent or lat~nt, or
whether social, economic, or statistical. Nothing was said or implied
about psychological facts since those are still judicially assumed to have
little to do with vital governmental questions.· Nevertheless, because
the decision broadened the evidence base for the determination of the
elements which contribute to a legal result, judicial competency was
raised in the same way that a doctor's competency would be improved
by knowing of Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood.
Alpheus Thomas Mason has not hesitated to characterize Holmes'
open-mindedness as "rare" when "most judges were singularly obtuse." But while Justice Brandeis,14 as Mason points out, insisted that
common knowledge was not enough, that all the facts were needed and
not merely the c9mmon facts, Brandeis had no conception of common
facts that were not "economic" or "social" in the narrow sense of the
terms. Therefore, we may say that judges still are singularly obtuse
when their knowledge is held against all knowledge.
H. The Excitement which Followed ~he Decision in the Elkison Case
There were some who said the states were being reduced to the
status of so many corporations 75 and that Judge Johnson would deprive
the states of their inherent rights 'by implication. 76 No necessity, however, could sway Johnson to place the states in the position to nullify
at will:
" ..• Is it not asserting the right in each state to throw off the
federal constitution at its will and pleasure? If it can be done as
74
The quotation is from MAsoN, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 576 (1946);
the paraphrase is one of a comment concerning Muller v. Oregon appearing on pp.

249, 250.
75

CARO~INIEN5_1S 49 (Charleston, 1823).

16

Id. 46.

-
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to any particular article, it may be done as to all; and, like the
old confederation, the Union becomes a mere rope of sand. But
I deny that the State, surrendered a single power necessary to its
security against this species of property.... Now, if this plea of
necessity could avail at all against the constitution and laws of the
United States, certainly that law cannot be pronounced necessary
which may defeat its own ends; much less when other provisions
of unexceptional legality might be resorted to., which would operate solely to the end proposed, viz,, the effectual exclusion of
dangerous characters. On the fact of the necessity for all this exhibition of legislation and zeal, I say nothing; I neither admit nor
deny it. In common with· every other citizen I am entitled to my
own opinion, but when I express it, it shall be done in my private
capacity." 11
The effect of the opinion was intensified by Johnson's "high personal consideration in the community." 78 Furthermore, Johnson's own
feelings were quite evident and definitely put him on the other side
from the majority in the city of Charleston. A letter which Johnson
wrote to John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State of the United
States, on July 3, 1824 from Charleston reveals that Johnson knew he
was championing an unpopular cause:
"Sir: I know not from whom the Government expects communications such as the present, but I am daily made sensible that
the eyes of the community are turned most particularly to the
Judges of the Supreme Court for protection of their constitutional
rights, while I feel myself destitute of the power necessary to
realize that expectation. Hence, although obliged to look on and
see the Constitution of the United States trampled on by a set
of men who, I sincerely befieve, are as much influenced by the
pleasure of bringing its functionaries into contempt, by exposing their impotence, as by any other consideration whatever, I
feel it my duty to call the attention of the President to the subject,
as one which may not be unworthy of an official remonstrance of
the Executive of the State.
"In the envelop which encloses this, I have taken the liberty
to enclose three documents. The first is an act of the Legislature
11

Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4,366 at p. 496 (1823).
From the Revie'I!' of his "Life of Greene" in 15 N. AM. REv. 416 at 417
(1822), referring to the advantages of this author's undertaking the biography. There
were some who considered Judge Johnson among the leaders "who were distinguished
alike for their virtue, talents, patriotism and public service." C. S. BoucHER, THE
NULLIFICATION CoNTROVERSY IN SouTH CAROLINA 134 (1916).
78

1 947]

JUSTICE JOHNSON

165

.,

of this State, passed at their last session, from which you will perceive how very far your expectations are from being realized, as
you express them to Mr. Canning, in your letter of June I 7th,
r823. The second is a paragraph from the Charleston Mercury
of the 23d ult., from which it will be seen how pointedly the South
Carolina Association, as it is called, are pressing the execution of
that law. And the third is an article from the Charleston Currier
of the 29th, which contains a report of the case of Amos Daley,
from which it appears that he was a citizen of Rhode Island, and
an articled seaman on board of an American vessel.
"The ground of defence taken for him will also appear, and,
in the disregard of them, the principles acted upon by the people
who are pressing these measures.
"This man has come off with twelve lashes, because 'he could
not help himself in returning to this port;' but you will see from
the law that this summary court possesses the power of inflicting,
in a most summary manner, twelve thousand lashes should they
think proper.
"I am wholly destitute of the power of arresting those measures. Both the writs of habeas corpus and injunction I am precluded from using, because the cases assume the form of State
prosecutions; and if I could issue them I have nobody to call upon,
since the district attorney is himself a member of the association;
and they have, further, the countenance of five other officers of
the United State: in their measures. To this fact I attribute much
of the confidence with which these measures are prosecuted.
"In fact, the law itself was passed under the influence of a
memorial of the association, who, I am informed, actually had it
drawn up here, in pursuance of their own deliberations, in order
to be submitted to the Legislature. It is emphatically their law.
The only resource of the masters for having their men taken from
them--or of the men-and the only mode of bringing up the subject to the Supreme Court is by an action for damages. But without friends, without funds, and without time, mariners cannot
resort to suits at law.
"I must again apologize for troubling you with this communication; and there are many private considerations that would have
deterred me from making it. But I am perfectly sure that I am
the only public functionary here by whom it would have been
made.
"The society has the countenan~e and support of some men
who cannot openly join it; and although I am confident there is
a decided majority against them, yet there are many wealthy and
distinguished men in it, and some whose rank in life ought, in my
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opinion, to have prevented them from taking part with it.
"A copy of Mr. Poinsett's letter to you on this subject has
been shown among his friends here, and I have perused it. At the
same time that I am well convinced Mr. Poinsett believed all that
he there urges in excuse of the measure, yet I am well persuaded
that it is in the power of no one to establish the facts there stated.
Indeed, I do not hesitate to express the opinion that the whole of
the alarm of z822 was founded in causes that were infinitely
exaggerated.·
.
"A few timid and precipitate men managed to disseminate
their fears and their feelings, and you know that popular panics
spread with the expansive force of vapor. The rest of the State,
I am well persuaded takes no interest in these measures, but
rather yields them to the fears of the city representation, where
their chief operatio,n is felt, than adopts them from an opinion of
,their necessity or utility." 79
Jervey says that this matter "put the match to the fire of sectionalism." He asserts, however, that every suggestion of Judge Johnson
was incorporated by the Legislature into the Amendment of 1823
which omitted the provision for selling the negroes into s\avery and
provided that it was not to apply to individuals employed in vessels of
war of the United States Navy unless they were found on shore after
being warned or to individuals coming futo the state because of ship79

Referred to in I WARREN, THE SuPREME CouRT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY
85, note (1922) and quoted in CoNG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st sess., Appx., p. 1661
(1850), in the remarks of Mr. Berrien on slave trade in the District of Columbia.
There had been correspondence between Mr. Adams and Mr. Canning, who had
complained on behalf of the British Government by letter of February I 5 preceding.
Adams replied on June 17 advising Mr. Canning that steps were being taken to remove
the causes of the complaints and to prevent recurrence in the future. The Elkison
case came before Justice Johnson after these diplomatic communications had been
exchanged and Justice Johnson called upon the District Attorney for his official
services. His first attempt was to present this matter before the State judiciary, because
he felt that the State Judge could give relief under habeas corpus whereas he felt
doubtful about his 'own right. He even interceded with the British Counsel and the
Northern Captains to suppress their complaints, but this effect was only temporary
because of the position taken by some that Mr. Adams was not authorized to give the
pledge which he had given Mr. Canning.
On August 19th, 1823 John Quincy Adams made the following record in his
Diary: "19th. I received a letter from Judge J<?hnson, of South Carolina, enclosing
a printed copy of his decision upon a habeas corpus in the case of a British subject
named Elkison, a colored man imprisoned under an Act of South Carolina, which he
declares to be unconstitutional. Mr. Canning remonstrated against this Act last winter,
and we were assured it should sleep. I sent Judge Johnson's letter to the President."
6 MEMOIRS OF JoHN QUINCY ADAMS 175 (1875).
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wreck, stress of weather or other unavoidable accident.80 The Senate
and House both declined to repeal the law of r822 which was on the
statute books at the time the Civil War broke out.81
Johnson's opinion as to the exaggerated and private nature of the
excitement of r 822, though shared by some publicists and others,
seems to have been wishful thinking.82 That Johnson was whistling
to keep up his courage is apparent from his statements and actions at
every turn. For example, we find him in r 822 circulating a pamphlet
in Charleston addressed "To the Public of Charleston," in which he
pleads, with more than ordinary show of emotion, for a better Uflderstanding with the people of his own community.
"My reputation is the property of the United States. It is in
safe hands, and defies scrutiny. But I wish to live in harmony with
those who surround me. The smiles of my fellow citizens are dear
to me. They will read and consider my defen,ce; and though for a
time a cloud may intercept the beams of their favour, I fear nothing. Persecution against an individual cannot triumph long: every
one will feel that it may become his own turn next; and though
misrepresentations may prevail awhile, the weapon finally recoils
upon the hand that would have inflicted the wound. Man was not
always the erring being he is now; there is a natural sympathy
between his soul and truth, a tact by which he still discovers and
instinctively delights in it.
"All the earth calleth upon the truth, and the heaven blesseth
it: all works shake and tremble at it, and with it is no unrighteous
thing." 88
I. Johnson's Contemplation of Resignation·
We may consider it as more than a mere coincidence that in r 8r 9,
the same year in which these laws were first proposed as necessary for
the preservation of the community of Charleston, Johnson seriously
80

81

JERVEY, RoBERT Y. HAYNE AND His TIMES 178, 179 (1909).
5 McMASTER, A H1sTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES 203, 204

(1902).
82

Beveridge thought the incident a pretext. 4 LIFE OF JoHN MARSHALL 383

(1919).
P. 16 (Charleston, 1822) in the records of the Charleston Public Library.
See also "Melancholy Effects of Popular Excitement," CHARLESTON CURRIER, June 21,
1822. Of this "essay" CAROLINIENSIS said: "Scarcely fourteen months have elapsed
since Judge Johnson by his celebrated anonymous essay, 'on the effects of popular
excitement,' held up his native State to the greatest possible odium. There was a
simultaneous burst of indignation against the man, who could write such an essay, and
the printer, to avoid the weight of obloquy which was fast accumulating upon him,
gave up Judge Johnson as the author. The impression that was then made never.
88
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considered resigning from the Supreme Court and accepting the job of
Collector of the Port of Charleston.84 What we have already seen indicates that the duties of Justice had tormented Johnson for some time.
Trouble had been brewing and the ferment was not its cause. That he
was tempted to escape is borne out by a number of utterances.
The inadequate emolument may have been an unconscious pretext. 85 Only a year before, in United States v. Palmer, Johnson had
played with the idea of resigning rather than send a man to death on
can be effaced from our memories. Can any excuse be made for him who publishes
what must disgrace his own country abroad?" Id. 63 {Charleston, 1823). In the
issue of June 29th Johnson not only condemned the article which was attributed to
him· but hinted at a possible libel suit.
_
84
The NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER on February 1, 1819 carried the following
item: "Jodge Johnson, it is said, is about to resign his high office for one of less
dignity, perhaps, but the emoluments of which are more adequate to the services
rendered than those of a Judge of a Supreme Court.•••" The reference was to
the post of Collector of Customs of Charleston. The quotation appears in a footnote
in l WARREN, THE SUPREME CoURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 416 (1932).
The following excerpts from the ·Diary of John Quincy Adams, one of which
refers to the Collectorship, written in l 820 again evidences the sharp personal differences:
"Mr. E. B. Caldwell was here this morning. I asked him something about a very
extraordinary sally of Judge Johnson's on the Bench, at the close of the late session
of the Supreme Court here, in which he had indnlged himself in sharp reflections upon
the Executive Government, the Attorney-General, and, among others, upon me. He
spoke, it was said, in great passion, and threatened to publish his speech, but afterwards
thought better of it. Caldwell said that he had not remarked in it any allusion to
me; and if there was any, it had been in very general terms, as the counsel on both
sides in the argument had referred to an opinion said to have been expressed by me
on the question at issue. This Judge Johnson is a man of considerable talents and
law knowledge, but a restless, turbulent, hot-headed, politician caballing Judge. He
has been an ardent canvasser for Crawford, and, though a Judge flaringly independent,
a place-hunter for himself and his brother, a carpenter in Charleston, He obtained,
through Crawford's influence, the appointment of Collector for the port of Charleston,
kept it two or three months, in doubt whether he would accept it or not, and then
declined, attempting to bargajn his brother into it in his place. This is the man whose
judicial virtue was so much alarmed at the suspicion of Executive interference with
his duties. Termagant virtue!" 5 MEMOIRS OF JoHN QUINCY ADAMS, edited by C. F.
Adams, 42, 43 (1875).
.
Daniel Webster in ·a letter to Farrar on February 1, 1819, wrote: "The Court
met to-day, present all but Todd. Judge Johnson is here, and I suppose will sit this
term notwithstanding he is nominated as collector." Quoted in JoHN M. SHIRLEY,
THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CAUSES 243 {1879).
Some years later Justice Story, who was associated with Johnson for years and
had been a staunch figure on the other side of the Bench, was disconcerted by the new
turn of events. He considered himself as the last of the old race of judges and
wanted to resign. Id. 400; also note 3 19, infra ( to be printed in a later issue of the
REVIEW),
85

See note 84, supra.
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account of a comma. "Upon such a question, I here solemnly declare,
, that I neyer will consent to take the life of a man, in obedience to any
court; and if ever forced to choose between obeying this court, on such
a point, or resigning my commission, I would not hesitate adopting the
latter alternative." 86 There was more involved than mere emolument
of office.
J. The Civil War in the Offing

•

At the time the Elkison opinion was delivered on August 7, 1823
Charleston was both intolerant and intolerable. Johnson received a
warning to quit Charleston. He must have seen the full force of what
was now taking place despite his inclination to localize the trouble in
his later letter of July 3, 1824 to John Quincy Adams. The community
had no use for his opinions on the Constitution; that his so-called
Federalist leanings were inevitable in a realistic· evaluation of a cooperative union and also were set off by proper and fair consideration
for states' rights made little difference to the disturbed populace.
Eventually he left Charleston-it was a case of virtual exile. In the
heat of the nullification controversy about a decade later he moved to
Philadelphia, and shortly thereafter to Brooklyn, where he died. Four
days after he had filed his opinion, in a letter, permeated with dispair,
he poured out his heart to Jefferson. Here was a Lincoln in advance
of his time fighting with all of the sincerity of which he was capable
to preserve the Union against disintegration:
"I am also indebted to you for your invaluable Communi- cations of June 12th containing many observations which I sincerely wish could be made public with the Sanction of your Name.
I-acknowledge to you my dear Sir, that I have sometimes some
gloomy Doubts crossing my Mind respecting the Destiny of our
beloved Country. Those who cannot govern us may perhaps succeed in dividing us. That greatest of Evils Disunion, appears to
be losing its Terrors. My Ears are shocked at Times by Expressions
that I hear on the subject. I enclose you a Copy of an Opinion
which I had to deliver a few Days ago which will excite some
Surprise. The very Men who not long since made such an Outcry
against self-created Society are now heading a most formidable
one in this Place. How they will go God knows. I hope there may
be temperate Men enough among them to control the furious
Passions and false Policy which govern most of them.
"That unhappy Missouri discussion shewed its Effects in Blood
86

3 Whe~t. (16 U.S.) 610 at 637 (1818). (Italics the writer's.)
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the last year and will shew them in Persecution for many a Year
to come If it be true that 'quem Coelum perdere vult prius
dementat' I have received a Warning to quit this City. I fear
nothing so much as the Effects of the persecuting Spirit that is
abroad in this Place. Should it spread thro' the State & produce
a systematic Policy founded on the ridiculous but prevalent
Notion-that it is a struggle for Life or Death, there are no Ex,cesses that we may not look for-whatever be their Effect upon
the Union. They are really exemplifying your Observations on
their general Principles of Government. They now pronounce the
Negroes the real J acobins of this Country, and in doing so shew
what they meant when they honored us with the same Epithet." 87
Here is an ominous portent of events to follow-the Civil War
and all of the controversy which preceded and followed it. Johnson
saw disunion not only as a possibility but as a real danger. It was a
threat to his fondest hopes and ideals. He faced-to borrow a phrase
of his-"a cloud of circumstances unusually threatening." 88

K. The Cause and Not the Place
Johnson was sufficiently circumspect to recognize that the problems
were not purely Southern. In his Life of Greene he noted jealousies
between the States of Massachusetts and Rhode Island brought about
by early causes which had "left their traces so deeply engraven, that
to this day there is a want of cordial feeling plainly to be discovered
,,s9

He quoted a letter, dated December 31, 1775, to Governor Ward
from General Greene who grieved that jealousies should prevail which
if nourished "will sooner sap the foundation of the union: and dissolve
the connexion. God in Mercy avert so dreadful 'an evil! ..•• The
interests of one colony are no ways incompatible with the interests of
87

1 S.C. HIST. AND GEN. MAG. 211-212 (1900). Italics added to words "I
have received a warning to quit this city."
88
·
The St. Nicholas, 1 Wheat. (14 U.S.) 417 at 417 (1816). A sense of the
intensity of the feeling generated by this controversy at about the time Johnson left
for Philadelphia may be had by reading James Hamilton's inflammatory address delivered at St. Phillip's Church on November 22, 1833 entitled, "An Euloquim on the
Public Services and Character of Robert J. Turnbull, Esq., delivered on the laying
of the cornerstone of the monument erected by the State Rights Party to his memory,"
published in Charleston as a pamphlet in 1834.
James B. O'Neall, a contemporary admir~r of Johnson, spoke of the nullification
controversy as the "parent of all dissensions." James B. O'Neall, 2 BENCH AND BAR
IN· SouTH CAROLINA 281 (1859).
89
I WILLIAM JoHNSON 24.
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another." 00 Johnson undoubtedly reflected his own inner feelings
when he had italicized Greene's words in an earlier letter of October
16, 1775: "For my part, I feel the cause, and not the place." 91
The picture which Johnson painted of the Greene family indicates
to some extent his strong devotion to the idea of harmony whether
it be found in the family or in the federal government or in the state.
" His father was now dead, and the brothers had continued
the business of the forges and mills, harmoniously participating of
the proceeds as each stood in need; fully confiding in each other's
integrity and moderation. No jealous distrust, no wrangling
settlements ever took place among them; but when the common
chest was :h;1ll to overflowing, some purchase was made by common
consent, or some addition to their living or accomodations. It is
a very singular fact, and almost unprecedented in these times of
commerce and of lust of wealth, that the two brothers, who at
present own the Potowome Mills, have toiled together for sixty
years, and reared and set out their families, living in common,
and having never had a statement of accounts in all that time,
nor ever intending to have one. Yet their business has been lucrative and extensive. Such are the be~ign e:ffects of purity of heart
and disinterestedness of conduct. It was in a school like this, that
Greene acquired his habits of self-devotion. Accustomed from
early life to consider himself only as a member of a little community, to labour for the common interest, and covet no enjoyment but what he was ready and desirous of participating in common with his fellow labourers, selfish feeling, that foul destroyer
of all virtue and all happiness, was in him early subdued, or perhaps never felt." 92
Greene had been a strong proponent of the idea of "one people"
having one enemy. 93 "If we succeed, we gain all," Greene wrote to
Governor Ward, "but if we are conquered, we lose all . . . . " 94 On
December 20, 1774 General Greene had written to his brother Jacob:
"The calam~ties of war are very distressing, but slavery is dreadful." 95
Id. 47.
Id. 39.
Id. 25. See also Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Common Incidents of Life: II," 44 MICH. L. REV. 243 at 273 et seq. (1945); also Levin, "Mr.
Justice William Johnson, Creative Dissenter," 43 MICH, L. REv. 497 at 530 et seq.
(1944).
98 I WILLIAM JOHNSON 40.
94 Id. 46.
95 Id. 50.
90

91
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He was referring here to possible subjugatioh by Britian; there was
"a common interest in the opposition." Greene was astonished that
"ancient prejudices and selfish motives should prevail, at a time when
everything that is dear and valuable is at stake." 96 Johnson quoted
from a letter written by Greene to Mr. Jay, the President of Congress
on April 27, 1779 in which he italicized the following sentences:
"I have for a long time seen the necessity for some new plan
of civil constitution. I am more and more convinced of the necessity for it every day of my life. Unless there is some control over
the states by the congress, and unless they are in some way more
independent of the states than they have been we shall soon be
like a broken band." 97
Johnson noted in The Life of Greene concerning the latter part
of the Southern Campaign, "opposition to the minions of congress became popular; it was countenanced by men in power; the people were
really persuaded that their state sovereignty was in danger, and rallied
round it with characteristic ardour and enthusiasm of the day." 98 At the
outbreak of the Revolution there was, however, no lack of "native
citizens of talents, acquirement and spirit, competent to conduct so
great an undertaking." Johnson dwelt upon harmony:
"Harmony prevailed among the people, their circumstances
were easy, and the spirit of independence, or attachment to civil
liberty, which their fathers had brought over with them into the
colony, had been rostered by two successive revolutions, which
heaped honour upon the memory of their supporters, whilst they
greatly improved the condition of the citizens." 99
He recognized, however, that in the upper country of the Southern
States the case was materially different, since striking symptoms of
disaffection had manifested themselves due to a variety of causes.
There was rivalry or distrust between the upper and lower country in
these states, "feelings which," Johnson adds, "in a mitigated degree
exist to this day." Johnson noticed the·practice formed by the early
settlers of organizing societies for the common defense, which became
deadly hostile to each other. These associations attempted "to do
justice to themselves, and inflict that punishment among others, which
96
97
-._

Ibid.
Id. 144. (Italics of whole passage omitted.)

98 2

,

id. 392. The struggle between federal and state power appeared also in the

postliming question. Id. 344.
99 I id. ,257.
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ought to have devolved upon the State." 100 He observed that the
existence of this practice had left a distinct impression upon the rising
generations which even the courts found it difficult to eliminate. What
he called "clannishness" could have, however, a cultural value if
directed toward "the virtues and talents."
"There is, and perhaps ought to be, a clannish spirit in the
states of the union, which will ever dispose the writers they produce, to blazon with peculiar zeal, the virtues and talents of the
eminent men of their respective states. It is a tendency so natural
to man, that religion, the retirement of the cloister, and the barefooted friar who has renounced the world, acknowledge its influence in exaggerated eulogies on a patron saint or a beatified
, brother. And it will probably happen, that in future times, the
states that have produced the ablest writers, will enjoy the reputation of having produced the ablest statesmen, generals and
orators." 101
But he did not understand, as we can more clearly see today, the
psychodynamic implications of such exclusive forms of promoting "virtues and talents."

IV
THE PsYCHODYNAMic MEANING OF THE ELKISON OPINION

- A. Isolation Versus Communication
Beveridge cha_racterized the Elkison opinion as "almost as strong in
its Nationalism as those of Marshall." 102 To speak of "Nationalism"
in that period is to describe past events in present-day terms. Nationalism, as we think of it now, was hardly existent in Johnson's day. If
Beveridge means to speak of "nationalism" in the same sense as "federalism" then there is also need for qualification. Johnson, in some instances, as we have seen, was a stronger believer in a unifying federal
government than Marshall. To Johnson Federalism meant functional
and psychological harmony.
There is much to be learned from this period, but not if we follow
the conventional avenues of historical writing. It is not enough to
Id. 259.
2 id. 181.
102
4 BEVERIDGE, LIFE OF JoHN MARSHALL 383 (1919). This statement must
be read together with Beveridge's comment on the dissent of Justices Johnson, Thompson and McLean in Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet. (29 U.S.) 410 (1830), where he noted
"the departure, within the Supreme Court, from the stern Constitutional Nationalism of·
Marshall." Id. at 5 l 3.
100
101
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disavow political reasons and then find the single word "slavery" as
the over-all motivating force. Thus, Warren, commenting on the
Passenger Cases108 and their relationship to the slavery question says:
"Once more it was clearly shown that the opposition of Southern
statesmen to the expansion of the power of Congress over commerce
was based but slightly on abstract political doctrines relative to strict
or broad constructions of the Constitution, and very greatly on .the
concrete fear as to its effect on the power of the Southern States over
slavery." 10"' But a recapitulation of the many phases of federal-state
controversies, only a few of which are outlined here, shows that the
institution of slavery was only one of the psychodynamic elements
which engendered disagreements. The origins of the affective demonstrations which led to the Civil War are not that simple. And, of
course, the same-holds true of the tendency to ascribe all to the desire
to preserve the Union.
It does not require the institution of slavery to stir up the ambiva-:lent identifications which attach themselves to the ideas of "states'
rights" or the "sovereignty" of peoples and their right to be "independent." The United Nations Organization will attempt with the.crude
legal mechanisms available to harmonize some of these influences. Its
supervening organization without psychodynamic education on the
widest scale ever known will offer but little to solve the problems of
localistic aggressions. And, what is more, competing world ideologies
will absorb much of the effort which woulc:l otherwise be convertible into the idea of a world union of some kind. As an example, the
non-communicative Russians hold out to their peoples the aggressive
and militant idea of world domination of their particular brand of
humanitarianism. And very recently a religious "supernationalism" 105
has been announced as a step toward better humanity. While the Nazi
and Japanese ideologies have recently been vanquished with arms, new
ones will appear and are appearing. Hundreds of millions in Asia and
the Near East are finding emotional expression through intensification
103 7 How'. (48 U.S.) 283 (1849). The majority rejected Johnson's contention
that the power over commerce was exclusive in Congress. But a divided court held that
the laws of Massachusetts and New York were unconstitutional because they- imposed a
tax on immigration, which had been sought to be accomplished by taxing the master of
each vessel brought into the state from another state or a foreign country. The Court
dismissed the argument that the individual states could thus prevent the spread of
pauperism. It will be recalled that these laws had been cited as a precedent by the
protagonists of the South Carolina law in the Elkison case, supra.
lO,I, 2 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 168 (1932).
105 See Declaration of Pope Pius XII, Newspaper Notices of February 21, 1946.
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of the ideas they acquired from their parents and the color of skin
they inherited from them. Separatism, isolation and exclusion and
their concomita'nts of superiority and domination offer but faint hope
for the future without an improvement in communications. The Elkison case is not outmoded history. Numerous "sovereign" states in the
international scene offer problems of communication rooted in the most
deeply unconscious and conscious motivations. Unfortunately, they are
not understood by the conventional statesmen.
B. Law, Disease and Impurity

Thus we find the political background of the Elkison case in a most
unsatisfactory condition, since neither the facts nor conclusions are
clearly agreed upon. Scientific history cannot be written unless one
refuses to be misguided by the particular political and social manifestations recorded by historians of an earlier period. What seemed to them
finalities cannot be viewed as such today. The ignorance of earlier
centuries which solved social and legal problems on -an introspective
and magical basis can hardly serve the needs of today. Better knowledge is now available. We may certainly accept many of the facts of
earlier writers but are not bound by their use of them. While complete
detachment is most difficult of attainment, since every historian thinks
and feels as a person, nevertheless, scientific history is impossible unless a high degree of self-scrutiny is applied. Let us, therefore, probe
scientifically into some of the psychodynamic causes for the passage of
the South Carolina Act. If law arises out of fact then all facts must
be examined before a scientific understanding of law can be written.
The act was justified by the people of South Carolina as a moral
quarantine law.106 The analogy to quarantine of diseased persons was
106
Warren, in a footnote, quotes Thomas Ritchie in the WASHINGTON UNION
of March 13, 1851 to the effect that Jefferson took the side of Johnson's opponents
and "vindicated the right of South Carolina to pass such a moral quarantine law."
1 WARREN, THE SUPREME CoURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 625, note (1932).
The writer has not investigated the basis for Ritchie's remark; but the fact that Johnson reopened his friendship with Jefferson at the time of the Elkison case would have
to be weighed in that connection.
Marshall privately was unreserved in his criticism of Johnson's opinion and accepted the idea of local quarantine of peoples. Writing to Justice Story on September
26, 1823 he seemed to be delighted that Johnson had "hung himself on a democratic
snag in a hedge composed entirely of thorny states rights in South Carolina." He comments on the extent of the feeling and irritation in the South over Johnson's opinion
where it was considered "as another act of judicial usurpation."· He touched upon the
threats to the Constitution. " ••• Fuel is continually added to the fire at which
exa/.tee's are about to roast the Judicial Department." He then adds: "You h:tve, it is
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taken literally; the contention ·was that the importation of free negroes
was to be compared to the importation of diseased men. They pointed
to the health laws enacted by some northern states and the quarantining
of South Carolina ships by New York. The idea of infection was not
invoked, however, for legal reasons alone. Those who urged the similarity were serious about it. When the Senate of South Carolina voted
that it was the duty of the state to "guard against, insubordination or
insurrection" among the colored population and that such right was
paramount to "all laws, all treaties, all constitutions'' 101 it revealed
that fear was the psychodynamic basis for taking measures against
"moral contagion." 108 Insubordination and moral pestilence were considered one and the same. Caroliniensis opposed the free and uninterrupted ingress of colored people into the state as a formidable evil.
"To permit such persons, with such principles, to have a foothold on
our soil, is to introduce a moral pestilence, which must destroy sub. ordination in the slave, and with it the State itself .... It is a moral
contagion. It is the Upas tree, whose touch is death . . . It is a pestilence which walks in darkness and sickness which destroys m noonday." 109
said, some laws in Massachusetts, not very unlike in' principles to that which our
brother has declared unconstitutional!" Referring to a law similar to the South Carolina law the Chief Justice said: "We have its twin brother in Virginia; a case has been
brought before me in which I might have considered its constitutionality, had I chosen
to do so; but it was not absofotely necessary, and as I am not fond of butting against
a wall in sport, I escaped on the construction of the act." Quoted in I WARREN; THE
SUPREME CouRT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 626 (1932). See also Levin, "Mr.
Justice William Johnson, Creative Dissenter," 43 MICH. L. REv. 497 at 523 (1944).
A portion of the letter is also quoted in 4 BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JoHN MARSHALL

382 (1919).

_

Beveridge recognized the Elkison case in Johnson's dissent in Osborn v. The Bank
of the United States, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738 (1824). "Seemingly, Justice Johnson
dissented; but burning with anger at South Carolina's defiance of his action in the
negro sailor case, he strengthened Marshall's opinion in his very dissent." He quotes
Johnson's statement that a "state of things has now grown up, in some of the states,
which renders all the protection necessary, that the general government can give to this
bank." Beveridge adds that despite the stirring appeal Johnson held that the Supreme
Court had no jurisdiction. 4 id. 394.
107
4 BEVERIDGE, LIFE OF JoHN MARSHALL 383, 384, note 4 (1919), quoted
from NILES' WEEKLY REGISTER, vol. 27, p. 242 (1824).
108 Attorney General Berrien in 18 3 I rendered an opinion that South Carolina
could protect its colored people against "moral contagion." 1 WARREN, THE SUPREME
CouRT IN UNITED STATES H1sTORY 626, note (1932).
109
P. 41 (Charleston, 1823). Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes, far ahead of his
times in the understanding of the dynamics of the human-mind, exploded the falsity of
the analogy: "Another mechanical notion is that which treats moral evil as bodily
disease has so long been treated,-as being a distinct entity, a demon to be expelled, a
load to be got rid of, instead of a condition, or the result of a condition. But what is
most singular in the case of m~ral disease is, that it has been forgotten that it is a living
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To be satisfied with a "political" explanation of the events of the
times after reading the last quoted sentence is to be content with the
type of superficial rationalization which we are now beginning to understand as no longer primary. We are here concerned, rather, with the
ideas of purity and health and the converses of dirt and pestilence as
legal means of ordering society. What we have here is the dynamic
affect attaching to man's most primitive means of regulating behavior.
We may follow as a guide Johnson's idea that the progress of men in
society in regard to their rights is parallel to that of man in primitive
society. 110 Let us examine what primitive society reveals.
We are not concerned at this point with the so-called "negro problem" or race problems as such, although "one of the great tragedies of
the negro problem is that Americans have not so far taken the trouble
to understand it. We have unknowingly mixed fact and prejudice.
We have refused to admit that the inferiority of the Negro is largely
made on earth and not in heaven." 111 Johnson was clearly right when
creature in which it occurs, and that all living creatures are the subjects of natural and
spontaneous healing processes. A broken vase cannot mend itself; but a broken bone
can." MECHANISM in THOUGHT AND MoRALS 88 (1871).
The medical profession, which is giving much thought to psycho-dynamic aspects
of disease, seems to be leaving jurisprudence as almost an obsolete science. Thus, the
natural law theories may be compared to the conception of disease as an external thing
or an "autonomous entity''-as put by Seguin who calls attention to the obsession of the,
idea of disease as something external added to the organism which in primitive society is
recognizable as demoniac possession and in modern medicine in the idea that a specific
bacillus is the "cause" of a disease. The author demonstrates the fallacy of causality and
accepts the idea of functionality. It is not alone a specific bacillus, as Pophal had
shown, that is the cause of pneumonia but one must take into consideration various
circumstances attending the disease such as disposition to illness after infection and
other factors which are put into motion from the outside. Seguin offers as a definition
that "disease is the reaction of the organism as a whole to external or internal stimuli
altering seriously its equilibrium." C. Alberto Seguin, M.D. (Lima), "The Concept of
Disease," 8 PSYCHOSOMATIC MEDICINE 252 (1946). Such an analysis has its place in
legal thought in measuring both the individual and his society as contributing factors in
a given legal situation. Thus, a theory of constitutional law which, as in Charleston,
sought to declare as legally "diseased" persons of a certain class is obviously incomplete.
This is because it omitted to consider the susceptibility of the ones who projected their
own insecurity or "disease" on to others. The relationship to natural law appears more
clearly when we consider the fact that natural law is merely, to such thinking, the
external opposite of "disease."
For the idea of "moral infection" in jurisErudence see I PAUL VrnoGRADOFF,
OUTLINES OF HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE 61, 62 (1920).
110
In Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 213 at 282 (1827); and see
Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Common Incidents of Life: II," 44
MICH. L. REv. 243 at 270 (1945).
111 From a Review of MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA, THE NEGRO PROBLEM,
AND MoDERN DEMOCRACY, 58 HARV. L. REv. 285 at 290 (1944). "People all over
this world ••• are becoming impatient with the dogged belief of the Caucasian that
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h~ traced such feelings in his Life of Greene to their enviromental
origins. "A strong, deep-seated feeling, nurtured from early infancy"
which prevented sharing "with a colour, to which the idea of inferiority
is inseparably connected, the profession·of arms." 112

C: Infection and Cleanness as Ambivalent
Primitive Psychodynamisms
These matters are fit subjects for the student of jurisprudenceindeed, necessary and unavoidable ones. Disease and uncleanness have,
to the primitive and child mind, a legal and jurisdictional connotation.
These are compelling legal categories or boundaries; and individuals
or ideas are admitted or thrust out of them often by the merest application of the magic of verbal inclusion. The language and thought of the
more civilized and the adult have not discarded this simple mental
means of unreal di:ff erentiation. Indeed, such expressions as "dirty
liar," "dirty politician" or "dirty crook" attest to the current prevalence
of the idea of pollution for purposes of social classification. In time the
· idea takes hold that purity is an end in itself. Hutton Webster, an
an~hropologist with a keen sense for observing mental processes, has
noted how it came about, that the socially desirable became the same
as the pure, the clean, and how the undesirable became the impure
and unclean and diseased. "As we pass from savagery to barbarism
and from _animism to polytheism, the. notion of taboo, at first vague
and determinate, tends to differentiate into the twin concepts of impurity and holiness. This differentiation, indeed, is nevertheless
perfectly accomplished even by peoples which have reached some measure of civili~ation; and the lower races find still greater difficulty in
a dusky pigmentation of the skin makes a man inferior. The essential hypocrisy and
bigotry of 'white supremacy' have been especially glaring to our 'inferiors' in the past
five years because we have been so puritanical in denouncing the racism of the Nazis."
Edwin A. Lahey in THE DETROIT FREE PRESS, February 26, 1946.
,
Ruth Benedict, the anthropologist, has pointed out that "scientific work on race,
on the contrary, proves that racial physical differences are nonfunctional, and contrast
sharply in that respect with physical specializations among animals." In "Recognition
of Cultural Diversities in the Postwar World," 228 THE ANNALS IOI at IOI (1943).
The divergence of viewpoint between t4e conventional l~gal and political approach
to racial problems and a psychodynamic evaluation becomes appallingly apparent upon
reacling the brief essay by Helen V. McLean, "Psychodynamic Factors in Racial Relations," 244 THE ANNALS I 59 .( I 946).
112 2 WILLIAM JoHNSON 275. (Italics the writer's.) His comments on General
Greene's owning and purchase of slaves will be found on page 401 of the same volume
where he remarks that this was "one of the heavy charges that exist against his
memory."
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distinguishing between what is daiigerous, because polluted, and what
is dangerous because sacred. The 'holy' thing and the 'unclean' thing
possess alike the mystic potency, the magico-spiritual power, the mana
or arenda, to employ a terminology which expresses early man's sense
of being ever surrounded by unknown agencies, among which he must
walk warily if he'is to walk in safety." 113 Webster goes as far as to
see in this dynamism of taboos something belonging to the general
stock of primitive ideas:
"In- such cases the doctrine of the fundamental unity of the
human mind seems alone to be capable of explaining the astonishing similarity of its products at different times and in different
parts of the world." 114
"Primitive psychology,". says Webster, "refining these ideas and
applying them to different classes of phenomena, produces the cognate
notions of pollution and sanctity. The corpse is unclean; the shedder
of human blood is likewise unclean; but the chief or king, who belongs
to a superior order of beings, is sacrosanct or holy. These characteristics
are easily regarded as infectious, as capable of transmission, not alone
by physical contact, but also by sight and mere proximity." And he
~,WEBSTER, REST DAYS,"A STUDY IN EARLY LAW AND MORALITY 86 (1916).
See also p. 2 3 l where the author discusses "Evil Days."
Among the Balinese certain professions are unclean and, if practiced in the village,
result in pollution. MIGUEL CovARRUBIAS, THE IsLAND OF BALI 56 (1938). Among
the ancients impurity extended to interdict the use of certain animals and the wearing
of certain materials. Dirt, as a negative, has been a potent psychodynamic concept in
the development of culture. It is associated with sin and evil. Authority was pure and
criticism or dissent was dirt. "I would sooner bite my fingers' ends than willingly cast
dirt on authority, or any way offer reproach to it," wrote Thomas Brattle, F.R.S., in
1692. Found in GEORGE LINCOLN BuRR, NARRATIVES OF THE WITCHCRAFT CASES,
1648-1706, p. 169 (1914) and id., p. 109. See, also p. 169. Lord Jeffreys was
obsessed with the ideas of smell and dirt. In addressing a grand jury he once said: "I
am ashamed of these things; but, by God's grace,! will mend them; for, as I have told
you, I have brought a brush in my pocket, and I shall be sure to rub the dirt wherever
it is, or on whomsoever it sticks." RICHARD HILDRETH, ATROCIOUS JUDGES 321
(1856).
See also: the sleep-walking scene in MAcBETH where cleanliness is related to the
violation of law and expiation by the ritual of washing. See I. H. CoRIAT, THE
HYSTERIA OF LADY MAcBETH 74-75 (1912); H. GoITEN, PRIMITIVE ORDEAL AND
MoDERN LAw 70 (1923); EDWARD CLo:qD, MYTHs AND DREAMS 232 (1885);
MARETT, FAITH, HoPE AND CHARITY IN PRIMITIVE RELIGION 73 (1932) (Marett
takes for granted that impurity is part and parcel of primitive jurisprudence, id. 158);
HENRY T. FINCK, PRIMITIVE LoVE AND LoVE STORIES 274, 488-489 (1899); MAINE,
EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 48 (1886); ERWIN WEXBERG, INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY 339
(1929).
.
114
WEBSTER, REST DAYS, A STUDY IN EARLY LAW AND MoRALITY 84 (1916).
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points out what is significant here: "Since persons, objects, and even
actions are all liable to infection, prudence dictates a variety of precautions; the dangerous individual or thing is removed to a safe distance; or is carefully isolated; or is subjected to a series of insulting
regulations. The entire community is interested in such proceedings,
and on certain occasions may itself be placed under a rigid quarantine." 115 It requires no extravagant deductions to trace to these psychodynamisms the maxim of equity that he who comes into court must
come with clean hands, that is to say, he must not have committed any
act which was socially dangerous.116
Taboo in its end result is primitive law. After reviewing a number· of rules of abstinence from the Land Dyak customs Webster
also finds other confirmation elsewhere which clearlv illustrates "the
passage of individual taboos, based on gross super;tition, into community ordinances which may sometimes have a real. justification in
their social usefulness." 117 Webster makes a point of showing the
utility of-the taboo: "It is obvious that sc;,me of these taboos tend, in5
11:

Id. 4-5 and 6-7.
Recently the Supreme Court was troubled with the "unclean hands" doctrine
in the case of Johnson v. Yellow Transit Cab Co., 321 U.S. 383, 64 S. Ct. 622 (1944).
The question was whether a carrier was entitled to a return of intoxicating liquors consigned from Illinois and seized in Oklahoma as being imported in violation of local law.
Mr. Justice Black for the majority said: "The maxim that he who comes into
equity must come with clean hands is not applied by way of punishment for an unclean
litigant but 'upon considerations that make for the advancement of right and justice.'"
Id. at 387. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissent also dealt with the matter: "The
abstention which equity exercises, as it should here, under the short-hand phrase of
the 'clean hands doctrine' is not due to any desire to punish a litigant for his uncleanliness." Id. at 403. Both opinions attempt to disavow the punishment motive for uncleanliness. There is a tendency to speak more often today in terms of the public interest which would bar a plaintiff's request for relief. This is especially true in patent
cases where lawful monopoly and restraint of trade is involved. In such cases it is
· misuse of the patent contrary to public interest which is prevented. Morton Salt Co. v.
Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 62 S. Ct. 402 (1942).
The words, "pure" and "clean" have become so established in their secondary
meanings as denoting freedom from differentiating factors that there are no adequate
synonyms. Accordingly, the writer finds himself using such terms continually. Thus
we speak of a "pure" chemical when all we mean is that it is homogeneous-a much
more cumbersome word.
117
WEBSTER, REST DAYS, A STUDY IN EARLY LAW AND MORALITY 45-67 (1916).
(Italics the writer's.) See alsC> pp. 6o-6J where the author points out how the taboo
has effected social solidarity on the one hand and individualistic self-restraint on the
other "greatly needed under primitivs conditions ••• such beneficial results are even
more manifest in the case of communal taboos. For when the restrictions are violated
by anyone, there is always the feeling that misfortune will overtake the entire social
group, and hence a duty devolves on each man, to see that his neighbor obeys the law.
Altruism becomes _a coercive process, and social cohesion is secured by each member of
the group making himself his brother's keeper."
,

116
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directly, to produce beneficial effects. The problem of all labour, except agriculture, during the season of rice-planting and harvesting
permits the inhabitants of a village to devote their time and attention
solely to the care of the crops. And the practical result of the taboo
against hunting is to provide a· much-needed closed season for wild
animals ...." 118 But it would hardly require an argument to show
that law has had beneficient effects either in its primitive or later forms:
law has followed taboo historically and psychodynamically. The tendency to compartmentalize, which is prevalent among social scientists,
could easily cause one to overlook for the moment the most striking ,
single characteristic of law, namely, its taboo origins and the continued
use of the taboo dynamism. While law as a broad conception takes in
all of the positive and creative purposes of culture its outstanding
present purpose is prohibition and repression, that is, taboo. This is
a good reason for trying to understand why it was that the magical
taboo preceded our ordinances and statutes; and why our present laws
regress in the minds of many-including many scientists-to earlier
taboo levels.
Webster has struck at the nucleus of the explanation of the tendencies of primitive peoples to impose prohibitions in critical periods
of storm and stress. Untoward events past or expected "may be-invested with taboos designed to meet the emergency in the communal
life and to ward off the threatened danger or disaster." He has turned
an excellent phrase to describe the mental process. Such peoples have,
so to speak, "institutionalized their fears," working out thereby a protective procedure highly complex and elaborate.119 Early Greek philosphers emerging from more primitive states filed a protest against
the institutions being ends in themselves. They traced into the institutions of taboo and justice the fear of the consequences of violations.
It is asserted that "taboos relating to fire may reflect primitive man's
fear of mysterious element which had not yet been completely tamed
and harnessed to human use . . . . " 120 Johnson must have sensed this
when he wrote in his opinion: "One gentleman likened the importation of such persons to that of clothes infected with plague, or of wild
beasts from Africa; the other to that of firebrands set to our houses .
only to escape by the light." 121
Id. 50.
Id. 60, 86.
120
Id. 258. The balance of the sentence suggests as a more probable origin of the
taboos the fear of attracting evil spirits or influences. We prefer the portion quoted in
the text above as psychodynamically more basic.
121
Elkison v. Deliesseline, (C.C. S.C. 1823) 8 Fed Cas. No. 4, 366 at p. 496.
11s
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From the foregoing, which is merely suggestive of some of the
approaches to law as a dynamic study, we may, nevertheless, conclude
with assurance of accuracy that in addition to their other dynamic
functions the idea of purity and impurity or health and contagion in
legal thought are classificatory means. They classify on the primitive
level what is or is not \iesirable. These ideas have no concern with ·
our constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the laws because their
purpose is to create inequality. While the dynamism of moral contagion
is selective, its essential purpose is inclusion and exclusion on a magical,
primitive and infantile level. While functional classification is necessary, 122 as when we say that automobiles of a certain weight should
bear a certain tax and trucks of a heavier weight a larger tax, there
would be an obvious magical exclusion if cars driven by "white" men
were subjected to one tax and cars driven by "colored" men were
subjected to a higher tax. The magic would lie in the fact that the
classification was not based on experience derived from the need of men
to communicate with one another in a society where culture prevails
-but rather the superstitious valuation placed upon non-communication
originating in fear. Once the mind draws jurisdictional lines all other
thinking processes are affected and all later deductions take some of
122
~rimitive peoples used other means of classification such as mystic numbers
which "unlike those of ordinary arithmetic, are real categories in which thought naturally rests; they are not fortuitous counts of objects, but are rather subjective syntheses .•••" Id. 207.
·
Webster also studied the primitive secret society as a functional mechanism. "In
every primitive society there is a natural tendency for those of the same age, who have
consequently the same interests and duties, to group themselves on the basis of these
distinctions, and by that very grouping of like with like to separate themselves from
other and unlike groups." HUTTON WEBSTER, PRIMITIVE SECRET SocIETIES, A STUDY
IN EARLY PoLITICS AND RELIGION 20 · ( l 908). While such secret societies tended to
create and maintain caste their purpose was not always exclusive. There was a need
for personal aggression to be transmitted into community of purpose. Initiatory
gatherings were often the means of transition to '"larger tribal aggregates." Id. 28.
The more vicious forms appear both in primitive and more civilized society where a
destructive purpose is paramount. In North Carolina the practice of "husquenawing''
young men to weed out the weak and infirm was to keep them all in a dark house, half
starve them and drive them into a mad raving state. Id. 3 3. This seclusion was a
method of classification to avoid evil. Id. 4 7. This means of "natural selection" is
recognizable in some instances of ~odern scientific thought. The strong desire on the
part of some scientists to make haste to "purify" humanity is psychodynamically related
to the method of selection by "husquenawing" and the ideas of racial superiority. It
is a species of "natural law'' doctrine in which laws of science are aggressively invoked
to destroy what does not belong to a pattern. The foundation of such doctrine is "the
purity of his own cause/' This phrase, employed by Rudolph Hess, is quoted by Senator Elbert D. Thomas in THOMAS JEFFERSON, WoRLD CITIZEN 219 (1942). In ancient times strangers were considered "impure" and classified, therefore, as unfit to live.
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the meaning of the first. Each "pure race," for example, insulates itself
because the mind of the child is made accustom!'!d to such separation
by training. Thus, do we find the practice of tradition to be a tenacious
means for psychodynamic patternings of inclusion and exclusion to be
formed on the infantile level. There is no reason why the term "tradition" may not imply the more adult concept of the accumulation of
prior cultural values to be selected and rejected on the basis of value
and function.
The fault with a "pure theory of law," therefore, is that it settles
by inclusion and exclusion rather than by function. Indeed, jurisdiction
in law, language or religion is a function and not a superstition. Purity
is psychodynamically a jurisdictional concept which draws a boundary
line around what one thinks and feels rather than what one finds. In
modern garb it is basically as ineffective for cooperat;ive living as in its
older magical forms. While Professor Hans Kelsen seeks "pure law"
in order to avoid opportunism and partisan concepts of justice he does
so by a primitive method. Thus, while he urges a study of the dynamics
of the law and its processes of creation, for him "pure law" comes from
the state; and the individual who "creates law" is an organ of the
state.128 Thus the extremes of positive law and the purity of law are
allied. We are face to face with the purity of the state even as in
primitive life only the king or chieftan was pure and could not be
touched. There is much in Kelsen's writings that is worthy and scientifically directed, particularly his emphasis on the psychological and
anthropological sources of law. Nevertheless, purity in law is psychologically an excluding mechanism and, therefore, cannot be scientifically
founded; for, psychodynamically it is kin to every type of primitive
classification where magical exclusion and rejection prevail. If the
door can be closed to new evidence at any point there can be no science.
There can remain no vestige of superstition in the scientific approach
to jurisprudence. Because the method of the superstitious tradition has
been, throughout history, one of exclusion we must recognize therein
an affective temptation to be avoided. Surely, experience has amply
128
Hans Kelsen, "The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence," 55
HARV. L. REV. 44 at 64, 65, 69 (1941). See also other writings by the same author.
See review by Phil Stone of Kelsen's latest book GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND
STATE (1945). The reviewer says of Kelsen's theory of positive law: "It sounds to
me suspiciously like God in a new suit of "clothes." 32. A.B.A.J. 228 at 229 (1946).
See also critical review of the same work by Paul Sayre who has very correctly discovered
a search for the absolute despite Kelsen's relativism. He warns against "unconsciously
excluding important elements and against partiality in recognizing others." 59 HARV.
L. REV. II84 at II88 (1946).
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demonstrated that .the negative force of exclusion has been a more
potent social force than its positive side which should aim at scientific
differentiation. "Pure" or exclusionary theories become substitutes for
what we find in primitive thought as the thought process which has become a thing- be it a demon or the theory of natural law. It is no
accident that in the past what was stamped as pure was also sanctified
as natur.al. So common is this pitfall that even Justice Holmes, who
rejected natural law, nevertheless in the mind of many raised "intuition" to the level of dominance formerly held by natural law. Thus,
intuition-although it is highly personal-also tends to become a
"thing," an imaginary standard of guidance known only to the unconscious processes of the one who invokes it. Those who possess it
seem endowed with a "something'' which guides them to enlightened judgment; and thus· they may be considered able judges of
psychic experience without any scientific knowledge of its processes;
Such are the ones who are called upon to separate the pure from the
impure. Yet there is little more than largely unorganized reaction to
human behavior to support such procedure. "I am not sure," Holmes
once wrote to Dr. Wu who had asked him whether he didn't believe
that the law was a monad, "that you are not attributing to the name
a mystic entity distinct from the facts that we find among men." 12<1.
But intuition may also be a "mystic entity" and the quest for purity
may easily be rocognizable as entity-seeking. Legal science dare not
adopt the methods of the Hindu Brahmins. No part of scientific investigation can be permitted to be classed as impure and untouchable.
The e:ffect of all such classifications is to break off free communication
between the items included and those excluded with the result that the
12
<1. Letter dated February 5, 1923, printed in SHRIVER, HoLMES, His BooK
NoTICEs AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND PAPERS 158-159 (1936).
What Sumner said of natural law applies to pure law-all we need do is substitute
the word "pure" for natural: "What we think 'natural' and universal, and to which
we attribute an objective reality is the sum ttaits whose origin is so remote, and which
we share with so many, that we do not know when or how we took them up, and we can
remember no rational selectio~ by which we adopted them. The same is true of
common sense. It is the stock of ways of looking at things which we acquire unconsciously by suggestion from the environment in which we grew up." WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS, c. 9, § 496 (1913).
'
John Ferguson McLennan put it well: "Are we too sanguine," he asked, "if we
venture to predict that their solution will yet be reached, and will exhibit early human
history in a very different light from that in which it has hitherto been regarded, by
what Dugald Stewart calls 'that indolent philosophy which refers to ~ miracle whatever appearance both in the natural and moral worlds it is unable to explain?'"
STUDIES IN ANCIENT H1sTORY, Am. ed., 161 (1886).
The cleaving to natural law doctrine finds its simplest answer in the opposition to
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former become "superior" and the latter "inferior." The science of the
law cannot stop at the idea of an "anti-image" 125 even though the idea
of purity as advanced by Kelsen approaches from the positive side. Surely, Kelsen never wished such a result-but the absence of wish would
not exclude its possibility. A more real approach is found in the remarks
Mr. Justice Frankfurter made a number of years ago: "After all, what
is law? It is nothing but a body of arrangements by which society adjusts in peace the inevitable conflicts of feelings and interests. And these
conflicts do not derive from within the law, except when the law is not
adequately responsive to the long-range needs of society; these conflicts
derive from a shift in interests, in feelings, in attitudes, in the concerns
of society." 126 Where, may we ask, is there room for the idea of purity
in such a wide-range conception?
Thus, purity and state sovereignty were aligned to serve the immediate purposes involved. Warren, referring to the case of Marbury
v. Madison, 121 the Embargo Act and the Pennsylvania Rebellion, sees
little more than opportunism in the positions taken:
"These three episodes, moreover, present an interesting illustration of the fact that, throughout American history, devotion to
State-Rights and opposition to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Government and the Federal Judiciary, whether in the South or
in the North, has been based, not so much on dogmatic, political
theories or beliefs, as upon the particular economic, political or
social legislation which the decisions of the Court happened to
sustain or overthrow. No State and no section of the Union has
found any difficulty in adopting or approving the State-Rights
theory, whenever its interest lay that way." 128
new things and inventions even though modern society is committed to technological
progress. For a revealing discussion see Bernhard J. Stern, "Resistances to the Adoption
of Technical Innovations," in TECHNOLOGICAL TRENDS AND NATIONAL PoLicY, Report of subcommittee on Technology to National Resources Committee, 39 at 59 et seq.
( 193 7). The discussion of the psychological factors involved in technological complexity gives effect to such elements as fear, habit, desire for personality equilibrium and
status, and the tendency of groups to coerce their members to conformity. The presence
of such factors in the field where change is essential is almost an anomaly. Nevertheless, there are psychodynamic bases for such attitudes which have hardly been explored.
125
"Many 'movements' live by the fabrication of these anti-images. We have
developed_ no educational safeguards against the credulous reception of them. They are
the stock in trade of every unscrupulous propagandist." R. A. Maclver, "The Power of
Group Images," 14 THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR 220 at 223 (1945).
126
Frankfurter, "Summation of the Conference," 24 A.B.A.J. 282 (1938).
127
1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803).
128
l WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 388 (1932).
The problems raised by the duality of state and federal governments are psychologically
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That slavery alone was not -t~e basis of later divisions' is apparent
from an examination of the,cases which followed the Elkison decision.
The divisions were sharp be they questions of tariff, navigation, Indian
problems, banking or insolvency laws. While the Constitution was
framed upon the theory that "prosperity and salvation are in unison
and not division" 129 the actual working of government oscillates from
individualism to cooperation and the alternate identifications. Often
the political views are expressed as feeling outlets with little attempt
to relate particular attitudes to a mutually communicative level.
The Elkison case and its incidents have not been eclipsed by subsequent events. The psychodynamic factors which .operated then are
evident today at every turn. The device known as projection selects
and then ~xcludes from one's own receptivity the things and persons
which have been omitted from the class: such things and persons are
thenceforth impure, infectious, taboo and unlawful. If one mobilizes
his affect around states' rights then the federal government is· only
a means of interference with liberty; and if one is federally inclined
then the idea of states' rights represents narrowness and separatism.
Whether it be in politics or· in any phase of mental activity a classification, in order to avoid this primitive magical dynamism, must be based
on "something more than whim or fantasy, a tyrannical exhibition of
arbitrary power." 130 The universal tendency to apply to all thinking
the scapegoat mechanism of projection upon which may be unloaded
one's own conflict is to be found in every attempt at non-functional
classification. One's own fears and aggressions thus become transferred
to the outside and appear finally as harsh and unequal laws or, in many
situations, as anarchical actions and destructive ideas "supported" by
theories.
akin to the problem of the individual in relation to his community. The approach
through right and duty only-while convenient for reasons of mental economy--offers
little understanding of the operation of the communicative processes going on. Hence,
there is that seemingly unreasoned alternation between state and federal emphasis. Conventional political science:, for example, makes no attempt to trace the family units into
their political surrogates from the psychological point of view.
129 Mr. Justice Cardozo in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 at 523,
55 S. Ct. 497 (1935).
180
Mr. Justice ~ardozo, dissenting in Binney v. Long, 299 U.S. 280 at 298, 57
· S. Ct. 206 (1936).

